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CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION
SHELLEY WELTON *
To combat climate change, many leading states have
adopted the aim of creating a “participatory” grid. In this
new model, electricity is priced based on time of consumption
and carbon content, and consumers are encouraged to adjust
their behavior and adopt new technologies to maintain
affordable electricity. Although a more participatory grid is
an important component of lowering greenhouse gas
emissions, it also raises a new problem of clean energy
justice: utilities and consumer advocates claim that such
policies unjustly benefit the rich at the expense of the poor,
given the type of consumer best able to participate in the
grid. These arguments pitting clean energy against equity
often prove persuasive to energy regulators considering
whether to adopt or maintain clean energy policies.
But these arguments fail to seriously engage the question of
how energy law’s historical equity norms should be
interpreted and applied in the era of climate change. This
Article concludes that there are legitimate and
underappreciated equity concerns with the participatory
grid, given that participation in the grid is likely to stratify
along income lines. However, these equity concerns do not
justify slowing progress on climate change, given the extreme
inequities raised by that problem itself. Fortunately,
however, there is a longstanding tradition of attention to
equity concerns within electricity law that paves a way
forward. Throughout the twentieth-century project of
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electrification, electricity law focused on expanding the range
of Americans able to access affordable electricity. Twentyfirst century regulators, in contrast, plan to require
consumers to participate in the grid in order to maintain
affordable power. This new vision requires a new
instantiation of electricity law’s long-standing equity
commitment: a project of “clean electrification,” which seeks
to expand participation in emerging clean energy
marketplaces to all Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, the environmental justice movement has
persuasively argued that environmentalism suffers from a
class and race problem, given the ways in which environmental
laws appear to concentrate environmental harms in low-income
and minority communities. 1 Responding to this critique,
environmentalists and politicians have more recently
celebrated the potential for clean energy policies to benefit lowincome and minority communities by providing secure, wellpaying jobs. 2 Some such jobs are materializing, particularly in
the booming field of rooftop solar energy, 3 but with unfortunate
side effects: the suite of policies boosting green jobs also creates
a new genre of environmental justice challenges, 4 which this
Article terms “clean energy justice.”
The clean energy justice concerns addressed here focus on
the inequitable effects of clean energy policies, which may often
disproportionately benefit the wealthy while leaving remaining
1. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 790
(1993); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT 31–32 (2001). For a recent prominent example, see John Eligon, A
Question of Environmental Racism in Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/a-question-of-environmental-racism-inflint.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MS22-3Q43].
2. In THE END OF ENERGY, Michael Graetz quotes President Obama as
promising “[m]illions of new jobs. Jobs that pay well” as a result of clean energy
policies. MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY 167 (2011); See also VAN JONES
WITH ARIANE CONRAD, THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY: HOW ONE SOLUTION CAN
FIX OUR TWO BIGGEST PROBLEMS 10–11 (2008); Michael Bastasch, Hillary Mimics
Obama and Promises “Millions of Green Jobs,” DAILY CALLER (June 15, 2015),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/15/hillary-mimics-obama-and-promises-millions-ofgreen-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/KC9P-VDKC]. But see Michelle Chen, Where Have
All the Green Jobs Gone?, THE NATION (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/
article/where-have-all-green-jobs-gone/ [https://perma.cc/27AV-RRAF] (chronicling
the disappointment of many in the labor movement as green jobs have failed to
provide large-scale, long-term employment solutions). Graetz advocates “[a] hefty
dose of skepticism” about the green jobs rhetoric. Supra at 169.
3. See Cristina Maza, Solar Power: The Next Energy Jobs Juggernaut?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Environment/Energy/2016/0114/Solar-power-the-next-energy-jobs-juggernaut
[https://perma.cc/DYK9-Y7VR] (“[O]ne out of every 83 new jobs created economywide in 2015 was in the solar industry.”).
4. In contrast to the traditional environmental justice focus on concentration
of environmental harms in low-income communities, the focus of clean energy
justice is on the concentrated accrual of environmental, economic, and
participatory benefits to more affluent Americans, while others are left behind.
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energy consumers to shoulder outsized costs. 5 Take, for
example, the case of Arizona, one of forty-four states to adopt
“net metering,” a policy that lets those who install solar panels
run their electricity meters backwards when they make more
power than they can use. 6 Net metering has helped make solar
panels the “next granite countertop,” a desired accessory for
affluent homebuyers. 7 But the fact that net metering lowers
these consumers’ bills means that those without solar panels
pay proportionally more to support the electricity grid’s
upkeep. A 2013 television spot aired in opposition to the policy
draws upon this fact. The spot features a worried mother, with
two children at the table behind her completing homework,
who looks into the camera and explains: “Fairness—it’s
something we value in Arizona. At a time when so many are
struggling to pay their bills, it just doesn’t make sense to force
hard-working families to cover the costs for people who choose
to add solar panels.” 8 In response to this campaign, Arizona
regulators voted to impose additional monthly charges on solar
customers and thereby slowed the growth of renewable energy
in the state. 9
Was Arizona right to slow a successful clean energy
program partly on the ground that affluent customers
participated in greater numbers? State regulators and energy
law scholars have recently begun to devote considerable
attention to this question. Regulatory proceedings in dozens of
5. By defining the concerns I address here as “clean energy justice” concerns,
I do not mean to limit the emerging field of clean energy justice to these
distributive challenges alone, although I believe them to be a central problem of
the field. Clean energy justice might also include concerns over any
disproportionate impacts of siting “clean energy” facilities, questions of how to
best empower low-income and minority communities to choose how and when to
participate in clean energy, and a range of other concerns about the ways that
clean energy touches (or fails to touch) low-income and minority communities.
6. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE. § R14-2-1811 (2016); WILSON RICKERSON ET AL.,
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), RESIDENTIAL PROSUMERS—DRIVERS AND POLICY
OPTIONS 77 (2014).
7. Justin Doom, Solar Panel Is Next Granite Countertop for Homebuilders,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-09-10/solar-panel-is-next-granite-countertop-for-homebuilders
[https://perma.cc/H2VF-HFMR].
8. Prosper.org, A Fair Solar Future, YOUTUBE (Aug. 23, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kpgXhQXgKGE [https://perma.cc/A79B-D8SA].
9. See Arizona Public Service Company’s Application for Approval of Net
Metering Cost Shift Solution, 310 P.U.R.4th 121 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n 2013)
[hereinafter AZ Net Metering Decision]; Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and
Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 121 (2015).
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states are considering the distributive effects of existing or
proposed clean energy policies. 10 At the same time, scholars
have disputed the legitimacy of distributive concerns,11
discussed the need to balance affordability and environmental
concerns within public utility law, 12 called for greater
investment into renewable energy and energy efficiency in lowincome and minority communities, 13 and more generally
questioned the durability of electricity law’s current structure
in a clean energy future. 14
To date, however, no one has offered sustained
engagement with the questions of how electricity law has
historically coped with distributional concerns, and how clean
energy policies challenge the field’s long-standing practices in
this regard. Perhaps the failure to engage deeply with the
distributive justice arguments against clean energy stems from
their sources. Utilities and libertarian advocacy groups
advance the majority of these claims, raising questions about
their underlying motivations. 15 But the source of these
10. See infra Part III.
11. Rule, supra note 9, at 116 (cataloguing utility campaigns against net
metering and questioning their use of “notoriously fuzzy” fairness arguments).
12. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric
Utility Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer
Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2013).
13. See Deborah N. Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILL. L. REV.
25, 25 (2013) (arguing for increased “development of renewable energy and energy
efficiency in environmental justice communities” as a matter of policy); Vien
Troung, Addressing Poverty and Pollution: California’s SB 535 Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Fund, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 496 (2014) (describing effort to
bring California’s cap-and-trade revenues to low-income communities).
14. See generally William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014); Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff:
Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712
(2014); see also Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition
Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2014); Michael P.
Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive
for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2012) (describing how
utilities’ business model presents a barrier to reducing demand); Elias L. Quinn &
Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture, Information
Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 839–41
(2010) (describing the tensions that exist between regulated utilities and the
smart grid agenda).
15. See Suzanne Goldenberg & Ed Pilkington, ALEC Calls for Penalties on
“Freerider” Homeowners in Assault on Clean Energy, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/alec-freerider-homeownersassault-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/9KYP-MQBY] (explaining how “[a]n
alliance of corporations and conservative activists is mobilizing to penalise
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arguments must be analytically separated from the question of
their legitimacy.
This Article evaluates the distributive justice arguments
against clean energy on their merits. It argues that there are
real reasons to be concerned that many of our most popular
clean energy policies will collectively help to create a new rift in
America: one class that employs increasingly sophisticated
gadgets to manage its energy use, save money, and gain an
attendant sense of participation in collective problem-solving;
and a second class that cannot afford such technologies and
pays mounting electricity bills caused by the need to
decarbonize the grid. 16 But although it affirms the legitimacy
of this challenge, the Article calls into question the cabined
nature of the present debate over clean energy’s distributive
consequences.
Mainstream arguments highlight the immediate economic
inequities of clean energy policies, charging that such
disparities provide reason for halting the policies. 17 But the
idea that one could stem these inequities through slowing clean
energy policies is rendered problematic by the complex
inequities of climate change itself. Climate change will harm
the poor first, worst, and longest—the poor of today, the poor of
tomorrow,
and
the
poor
both
domestically
and
18
internationally. To halt clean energy policies on distributive
justice grounds is thus a more complicated equity tradeoff than
many advocates would have regulators believe.
This Article argues that electricity law provides a
framework for a more nuanced approach to the question of how
to manage clean energy’s justice challenges. Distributive
justice concerns emerge in electricity law via long-standing
debates over what role “equity” should play within the field. 19
homeowners who install their own solar panels”); see Editorial, The Koch Attack
on Solar Energy, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/
opinion/sunday/the-koch-attack-on-solar-energy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8252LSB6] (documenting Koch Industries’ prominent role in challenges to state clean
energy policies).
16. “Decarbonization” is the elimination of carbon emissions—the chief cause
of climate change—from electricity production. Methods of decarbonization are
discussed infra Part I.F.
17. Part III infra discusses four clean energy policies under particular assault
on equity grounds: net metering, dynamic pricing, electric vehicle subsidies, and
energy storage.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. For this reason, throughout this Article I refer to the challenges raised
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Over time, electricity law has toggled between, and drawn
from, theories of both equity and efficiency. One line of
argument, emphasizing equity—or “fairness” 20—asserts that a
central goal of electricity law should be to bring power even to
those who struggle to afford it. The other predominant theory—
which rests on efficiency—argues that the aim of electricity law
should be to price services according to their costs as precisely
as possible, to provide the greatest overall welfare benefits.21
Observing the fact that electricity law, in practice, fits neatly
within neither of these frameworks, some scholars have
suggested that “equity” is “the mother of all confusion” within
electricity law. 22 In contrast, this Article suggests that there is
an underlying coherence to this dialectic: energy law’s central
distributive norm is one of ensuring widespread access to
affordable power. Achieving this aim has always required
compromise between the two poles of efficiency and equity.
And, as this Article traces, regulators have made just these
against clean energy on distributional grounds as implicating “equity” concerns,
by which I simply mean questions over how the benefits and burdens of the
policies are allocated. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social
Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 (2012)
(defining equity as the consideration of “uneven impact of a program on different
groups or individuals”).
20. See generally EDWARD E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1978) (arguing that public utility law
is largely an ongoing contest between the aims of fairness and efficiency). See also
BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL & MICHAEL H. DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE:
PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES 5 (2014) (defining “an energy-just world
as one that equitably shares both the benefits and burdens involved in the
production and consumption of energy services” and that “involves the right of all
to access energy services”).
21. For sources setting forth the tension between the two camps, see supra
note 20; JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961);
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 20 (3d ed. 1993);
Harry M Trebing, Equity, Efficiency, and the Viability of Public Utility
Regulation, in APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC UTILITY
INDUSTRIES 17 (Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds., 1981); Richard A. Posner,
Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 23 (1971) (elucidating
the phenomenon of “internal subsidies,” which cuts against theories suggesting
that regulation’s purpose is “to approximate the results of competition”); Jim
Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age of
Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1235
(1998) (explaining the inherent tension between providing aid to low-income
customers and implementing competition).
22. W. ARTHUR LEWIS, OVERHEAD COSTS 47 (2003). This confusion stems
from an inability to pinpoint the animating theory of electricity law—sometimes,
it appears deeply efficiency focused; at other times, it seems to care primarily
about distributive concerns. See infra Part II for more details on this dialectic.
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sorts of compromises in both long-standing and more recent
electricity law frameworks.
Climate change complicates the regulatory commitment to
widespread, affordable power. Experts widely agree that there
is a need for rapid “decarbonization” of the electricity sector in
order to effectively combat climate change and avoid dangerous
levels of warming. 23 To decarbonize, electricity regulators will
have to build new legal frameworks that achieve high
penetration of low- or no-carbon electricity generation, likely at
considerable expense. 24 Concordantly, they will have to grapple
with the complicated question of how to preserve the field’s
commitment to widespread, affordable electricity in a world
where we now need to promote less electricity consumption. 25
This Article asserts that there is space within these
changing aims to preserve a commitment to distributive justice
23. See James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”:
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and
Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 2 (finding that “there are already clear
indications of undesirable impacts at the current level of warming and that 2°C
warming would have major deleterious consequences”); SIR NICHOLAS STERN,
STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 238 (2006) (noting that
stabilization at any level of ultimate CO2 concentration will require reducing
global emissions by approximately 80 percent); IPCC 2014, Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds.,
2014) [hereinafter “WORKING GROUP III”] (“In the majority of low-stabilization
scenarios, the share of low-carbon electricity supply . . . increases from the current
share of approximately 30 percent to more than 80 percent by 2050, and fossil fuel
power generation without [carbon capture and storage] is phased out almost
entirely by 2100.”).
24. See RON BINZ ET AL., PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION:
WHAT EVERY STATE REGULATOR NEEDS TO KNOW 5–6 (2012) (predicting that
retail electricity prices will “rise sharply” in the next twenty years due to the level
of investment needed in the U.S. electricity sector); see also JAMES H. WILLIAMS
ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 24 (2014)
(estimating the median price of cutting carbon dioxide emissions 80 percent from
1990 levels by 2050 to be between $160 billion and $560 billion).
25. As a theoretical matter, decreased consumption of electricity might not be
necessary if we could convert electricity generation to 100 percent renewable
energy. But as a practical matter, given the likely expense and only partial
accomplishment of this aim, decreasing consumption is likely to remain a critical
decarbonization strategy for the foreseeable future. See Kate Galbraith, McKinsey
Report Cites $1.2 Trillion in Potential Savings from Energy Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES
GREEN BLOG (July 29, 2009), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/
mckinsey-report-cites-12-trillion-in-potential-savings-from-energy-efficiency/
[http://perma.cc/T76E-3CLA] (summarizing a report that estimates that the
United States could save $1.2 trillion through 2020 by investing in cost-effective
energy-efficiency options).
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that accords with electricity law’s long tradition of ensuring
access and affordability, even while pursuing decarbonization
policies. After all, electrification was never valued as an end in
itself. 26 Access is important because of the worlds that
electricity opens up: relief from backbreaking farm and factory
labor; 27 light to read by in the evenings, and a radio to connect
to politics and culture; 28 expanded markets for new
appliances; 29 “[c]omfort, cold beer, and warm homes”; 30 and
more recently, computers, cell phones, and the Internet.
Expanding grid access and ensuring low rates were
twentieth-century mechanisms for achieving these economic
and social benefits of electrifying America. 31 Now, climate
change requires a turn away from universal promotion of
increased electricity consumption as a driver of economic
growth and civic participation. 32 Regulators embracing the
imperative to decarbonize have increasingly turned towards
the strategy of creating a “participatory” grid. 33 In a
participatory grid, pricing signals and incentives will motivate
26. See JENNIE C. STEPHENS, ELIZABETH J. WILSON & TARLA RAI PETERSON,
SMART GRID (R)EVOLUTION: ELECTRIC POWER STRUGGLES 78 (2015) (“People use
energy to do things; having access to electricity is not an end in itself.”); David B.
Spence, Regulation, “Republican Moments,” and Energy Policy Reform, B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1561, 1580 (2011) (“It is not oil or gas or electricity that we really want:
rather, it is the services that they provide.”).
27. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER 516–17 (1982); DAVID NYE,
ELECTRIFYING AMERICA 185–235 (1998).
28. See CARO, supra note 27, at 514–15; see also THE NEXT GREATEST THING
110–17 (Richard A. Pence ed., 1984) (describing the educational, cultural, and
economic value of radio to newly electrified rural households).
29. See generally Gregory B. Field, “Electricity for All:” The Electric Home and
Farm Authority and the Politics of Mass Consumption, 1932–1935, 64 BUS. HIST.
REV. 32 (1990); NYE, supra note 27, at 238–39.
30. Linda Kanamine, Iowa Revolution: Town of Energy Pioneers, USA TODAY,
Apr. 22, 1992, at 8A (quoting a utility executive regarding what they really sell).
31. See infra Parts II.A–B.
32. See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 119 (2003) (describing the twentieth century
belief that Americans “simultaneously fulfilled personal desire and civic
obligation by consuming”); see also Lorie Higgins & Loren Lutzenhiser,
Ceremonial Equity: Low-Income Energy Assistance and the Failure of SocioEnvironmental Policy, 42 SOC. PROB. 468, 471 (1995) (criticizing the U.S. approach
to energy equity as belonging to the “recurrent theme in U.S. political culture”
that “substitute[s] . . . economic opportunity and growth for redistributional
equity”).
33. See, e.g., Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming
the Energy Vision, 319 P.U.R.4th 1, 3 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015)
(order) [hereinafter N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order]; see infra Part II for additional
examples.
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consumers to change their patterns of energy consumption in
order to alleviate climate change, through technologies like
“smart” thermostats, solar panels, energy storage devices, and
electric vehicles. 34 These kinds of participatory technologies
will allow consumers to use power when it is cheapest, and to
supply power back to the grid when it is most expensive,
thereby maintaining affordability. Such participation offers
underappreciated psychological benefits as well: through
participating in the project of decarbonization, consumers may
find a partial salve against feelings of helplessness and
vulnerability produced by climate change, and gain a sense of
engagement in a project larger than themselves. 35
The participatory grid vision has important parallels to the
twentieth-century challenge of electrification. Access to
affordable power allowed twentieth-century consumers to
flourish in society. Grid participation will be required to
provide twenty-first century consumers the affordable
electricity necessary to do the same. From this parallel between
regulatory eras flows this Article’s central conclusion: if grid
participation is to become the means of affordable energy and a
significant mode of civic engagement with respect to climate
change, then electricity law’s longstanding equity commitment
counsels for a concerted effort to widen the class of Americans
able to become a part of the participatory grid. The project of
electrification was the twentieth-century response to the
challenge of energy justice. In the coming decades, the
challenge of clean energy justice will require a project of clean
electrification, to broaden access not to the grid itself but to the
technologies necessary to be a successful twenty-first century
grid participant.
Lawmakers might work to broaden grid participation
through a range of programs and strategies. Because states
maintain jurisdiction over the interactions between energy
suppliers and consumers, 36 much of the potential for reform
exists at the state level. I suggest several prominent debates in
state public utility law where clean electrification norms might
play an important role: the continuing evolution of electricity
law’s core mandate to ensure “just and reasonable” rates; the
34. See infra Part I for a more detailed discussion of these technologies and
the policies motivating their uptake.
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
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question of how to manage the wealth of new data produced by
the smart grid; and conversations about the role of utilities in
the participatory grid of the future. I also discuss the ways in
which public utility law cannot fully accomplish clean
electrification, just as it proved unable to single-handedly
electrify America last century. Finally, I call into question the
individualistic notion of “participation” that prevailing versions
of the participatory grid embody. The history of electrification
counsels that our most successful grid experiments in terms of
equity and empowerment may come from focusing on more
collective forms of grid participation. 37 Thus, regulators might
pay particular attention to programs like community solar and
micro-grid formation for the community-scale participation
that they embody.
We stand at an important juncture for gaining a deeper
understanding of electricity law’s approach to distributive
justice. State clean energy efforts are likely to dominate
domestic climate change policy for the foreseeable future,
particularly given the Trump administration’s hostility to
federal climate regulation. 38 Relatedly, many states are
considering radically restructuring their energy governance to
meet the challenge of decarbonization. 39 As they move toward a
participatory grid, states may call on utilities to perform a
significantly different role this century than they did in the
previous century. These shifts present major opportunities for
re-envisioning the role that equity plays within the electricity
system, and for adapting enduring norms to meet the
challenges ahead. Updating discussions of energy law’s
historical equity norms for the present era is thus a matter of
both scholarly and practical importance.
This Article develops the argument for clean electrification
in five parts. Part I looks at how equity concerns factor into
current clean energy debates, focusing on four policies that
have received the most attention on these grounds: net
metering, dynamic pricing, energy storage, and electric vehicle
infrastructure. Part II turns to examine electricity law’s
historical commitment to equity, tracing the forms this
37. Thanks to William Boyd for encouraging this line of thinking.
38. See Kimberley A. Strassel, Scott Pruitt’s Back-to-Basics Agenda for the
EPA, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-pruitts-backto-basics-agenda-for-the-epa-1487375872 [https://perma.cc/KJK8-QXUV].
39. See infra Part II.A.
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commitment has taken over time. Part III discusses the ways
in which climate change and its disparate burdens present new
challenges for understanding equity within electricity law. It
argues that the best way to synthesize energy law’s equity
commitment and climate change’s many inequities is to pursue
clean electrification: a broadening of the range of Americans
able to take advantage of the participatory grid. Part IV begins
the process of imagining how clean electrification might
proceed, considering the promise and limits of public utility law
in achieving clean energy justice. Part V briefly concludes by
considering the politics of clean electrification.
I.

THE PARTICIPATORY GRID AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Across the country, states are tackling climate change in a
range of ways. In part, states are using broad mandates, 40
economy-wide solutions like cap-and-trade programs, 41 and
experiments with large-scale, carbon-free generation. 42 But
40. The most popular clean energy mandate is a “Renewable Portfolio
Standard” (RPS). Twenty-eight states utilize RPS policies, which require utilities
to obtain an annually increasing percentage of their power from renewable
sources. Similarly, twenty-six have Energy Efficiency Resource Standards
(EERS), which require utilities to achieve certain energy savings targets. See NC
Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Renewable Portfolio Standard
Policies, DSIRE (2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/78XTRQQT]; NC Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency
Resource Standards, DSIRE (and Goals) (Mar. 2015), http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-PortfolioStandards.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9PW-NE2M].
41. Ten states currently have cap-and-trade programs, which establish caps
on the amount of carbon dioxide that covered sources can emit and permit trading
of emissions permits among the sources. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95801
(2016) (establishing a greenhouse gas cap and trade program for California);
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2016) [https://perma.cc/K7WZ-BE9G] (explaining the carbon dioxide cap-andtrade program covering nine northeastern states). As numerous scholars have
documented, these cap-and-trade programs, if not well designed, raise equity
concerns of their own. Because these impacts are well explored elsewhere, this
Article does not focus on them. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 19; Tracey M. Roberts,
Mitigating the Distributional Impacts of Climate Change Policy, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 209, 209 (2010); Vien Truong, Addressing Poverty and Pollution:
California’s SB 535 Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
493, 520 (2014).
42. See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 844–54 (2016)
(describing state experiments with financing the construction of new nuclear
energy generation and carbon capture and storage facilities).
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increasingly, as either a complementary or an alternative
solution, 43 states are more directly mediating the relationship
between consumers and electricity, seeking to prompt more
active grid participation on the part of consumers. 44 And they
are doing so in ways that raise a host of new equity problems
by threatening electricity law’s long commitment to cheap
power for all.
This Part focuses on four popular state-level clean energy
policies often criticized on equity grounds: net metering,
dynamic pricing, energy storage, and electric vehicle
infrastructure. 45 It directs its focus to these state policies
because such state energy laws are where most U.S. climate
change policy is playing out. 46 Many scholars have weighed in
on why states are surprisingly active on climate change given
the collective action problems it raises, and this Article will not
retrace those steps. 47 For present purposes, it suffices to note
43. Even where cap-and-trade programs exist, they “may not be sufficient to
achieve ambitious near- and long-term emissions reduction targets,” such that
“[c]omplementary strategies are probably needed and certainly advisable.”
Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to
Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PNAS 18452, 18452 (2009); Ann E.
Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary
Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 207 (2012) (exploring issues of
complementarity and competition between economy-wide carbon policies and
more targeted strategies).
44. See infra Part I.A for a more detailed explication of this vision.
45. Notably absent from this list is energy efficiency policy, largely because
programs to distribute energy efficiency more equitably have long existed,
although in far from ideal form. See infra notes 233–235 and accompanying text.
Also absent from this list is federal and state tax policy. Because this Article
focuses on theories, history, and avenues for reform within energy law, it leaves
tax policy to the side. Nevertheless, as others have observed, tax policy certainly
compounds many of clean energy’s equity challenges, as tax credits for clean
energy predominantly go to the wealthy. See Severin Borenstein & Lucas W.
Davis, The Distributional Effects of U.S. Clean Energy Tax Credits, 30 U. CHI.
PRESS 191 (2016); U.C. Berkeley Energy Institute at Haas Working Paper No.
262, July 2015. Further examination of how tax policies and energy policies
interact—and have potentially compounding inequities—would be a useful
intervention.
46. I do not want to understate the importance of federal financial support for
clean energy projects, particularly the importance of tax credits: “Between 2009
and 2014, the federal government will have spent more than $150 billion in clean
energy projects through direct lending, tax expenditures, and loan guarantees.”
KEN BERLIN ET AL., STATE CLEAN ENERGY FINANCE BANKS: NEW INVESTMENT
FACILITIES FOR CLEAN ENERGY DEPLOYMENT 5 (Sept. 2012). However, federal
government spending has been declining as programs created under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act expire, see id., making states increasingly
important loci of climate policy in the coming years.
47. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental
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that states have stepped in to fill what has largely been a void
in federal and international clean energy policies over the past
two decades, and every state in the country has some clean
energy policies in place. 48 Although the Obama administration
took significant steps to federalize climate policy, state efforts
are likely to again return to the fore under the Trump
administration. 49 As these initiatives grow, so will the equity
concerns that they raise.
A. The Participatory Grid
1.

The Vision in Leading States

Before turning to the equity challenges raised against
particular policies, it is helpful to begin with a broader picture
of the vision that regulators have for transforming passive
Leadership: California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 63–64
(2013); Brandon Hofmeister, Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change
Mitigation, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 67 (2012); Vivian E. Thomson &
Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change
Policymaking and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2011); Hari M. Osofsky,
Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and
Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64 (2010); Richard B. Stewart, States and
Cities As Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 681 (2008).
48. See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RR5K-5EL5].
49. See supra note 38. If the Obama administration’s signature climate
regulation, the Clean Power Plan, remains intact, it too is likely to spurn further
state participatory grid strategies. The Clean Power Plan requires states to
develop plans for achieving mandated levels of emissions reductions from existing
power plants, but allows considerable flexibility as to how states achieve these
reductions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (giving states authority to design their
own implementation plans subject to EPA approval); EPA Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60
(2015). [hereinafter EPA Final Rule]. However, the fate of the Clean Power Plan
remains uncertain: in February 2016, the Supreme Court stayed implementation
of the Clean Power Plan during the pendency of a suit against it in the D.C.
Circuit. See North Dakota v. EPA, 136 U.S. 999 (Feb. 9, 2016) (order granting
stay); see also EPA Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan: Key Changes and
Improvements 3, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fscpp-key-changes.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K2TF-9G77]
(“EPA . . . anticipates that, due to its low costs and potential in every state,
demand-side [energy efficiency] will be a significant component of state plans
under the Clean Power Plan.”); U.S. Unveils Measures to Encourage Solar Power
Use, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.seia.org/news/
us-unveils-measures-encourage-solar-power-use
[https://perma.cc/87JL-8SWZ]
(explaining how the Clean Power Plan “provides strong incentives” for the
development of solar power).
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“ratepayers” into active “participants” in the fight against
climate change. The following two subparts aim to paint—and
then complicate—this vision. This subpart describes how
leading states are working to make the grid “participatory.”
Part I.A.2 then interrogates the extent to which this new grid
can really be considered “participatory,” acknowledging the
ways in which grid “participation” demands less robust
engagement than traditional political participation.
Several states make up the vanguard of efforts to create a
more participatory grid, including New York, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Hawaii, Maryland, and California. In these states,
regulatory commissions or their consultants have put forth
vision statements describing the shape they want electricity
markets and the electricity grid to take—all of which center on
inducing greater customer participation. New York, for
example, recognizing the “enormous and largely untapped
resource” of the “customer side of the grid,” is holding a
regulatory proceeding to establish new markets in which
Similarly,
customers
become
“active
participants.” 50
Massachusetts’ regulatory commission issued a 2014 order
“launch[ing] a new energy future for Massachusetts . . . [that]
will empower customers to manage and reduce their energy
costs.” 51 Minnesota is in the midst of a proceeding to create a
grid that “enables customers to manage and potentially reduce
their energy costs.” 52 In California, a 2013 Commission White
Paper asserted that “[c]ustomer participation, more than the
actions of the utilities or of the regulators, is critical to meet
California’s greenhouse gas emission goals in a cost-effective
manner.” 53 Since this time, California’s regulatory commission
50. N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 7.
51. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Util., Investigation by the Department of Public
Utilities on its Own Motion into Modernization of the Electric Grid, D.P.U. 12-76B
(June
12,
2014),
http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/
Attachments/Get/?path=12-76%2FOrder_1276B.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB2D-2X8Y]
(order).
52. See Nancy Lange et al., Building a Minnesota Conversation on Grid
Modernization with a Focus on Distribution Systems, Presentation, MINN. PUB.
UTIL. COMM’N (May 12, 2015), http://mn.gov/puc/documents/pdf_files/grid
_modernization_5-12-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RN5-QNXC]; see also Haw. Pub.
Util. Comm’n, Exhibit A: Commission White Paper: Commission’s Inclinations on
the Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities, PUC.HAWAII.GOV (2014),
http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Commissions-Inclinations.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K4U3-SYDD].
53. KRISTIN RALFF DOUGLAS & MARZIA ZAFAR, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N
POLICY AND PLANNING DIV., CUSTOMERS AS GRID PARTICIPANTS: A
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has launched several proceedings aimed at engaging customers
as “partners” in grid decarbonization. 54
What will the new participatory grid look like? Its shape
remains fuzzy, as vision still largely exceeds technological
capacity. 55 Nevertheless, a few elements seem clear. “Con”sumers of energy are becoming “pro”-sumers, not only
purchasing energy but also generating electricity through
onsite “distributed generation,” largely in the form of rooftop
solar panels. 56 A “smart grid” will better balance electricity
supply and demand by modernizing outdated infrastructure
and providing customers with new energy management tools. 57
Chief among these tools are “smart meters,” which record
time-specific energy usage data and enable two-way
communications between utilities and customers. 58 Smart
meters provide huge amounts of new data about energy
consumption 59 and allow electricity pricing to better reflect
production costs. 60 Such pricing reforms—particularly when
coupled with rising rates—might incentivize customers to
adopt a range of new technologies, including communicative
thermostats, appliances capable of automated control, and
electric vehicles. 61 These technologies could also allow utilities
FUNDAMENTALLY NEW ROLE FOR CUSTOMERS 3 (2015).
54. See id.; see also Proposed Decision on Order Instituting Rulemaking on
the Commission’s Own Motion to Conduct a Comprehensive Examination of
Investor Owned Electric Utilities’ Residential Rate Structures, the Transition to
Time Varying and Dynamic Rates, and Other Statutory Obligations, R. 12-06-013
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n
Proposed Decision].
55. Andre Begosso et al., Retail Resurgence, 148 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 42, 43
(2010).
56. See IEA, supra note 6, at 5–6; Sharon B. Jacobs, Consumer Generation,
ECOLOGY L. Q. (forthcoming 2016).
57. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid,
37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013); Quinn & Reed, supra note 14.
58. See Eisen, supra note 57, at 10–11; EDISON ELEC. INST., UTILITY-SCALE
SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS 1 (2014).
59. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Energy Consumption Data:
The Key to Improved Energy Efficiency, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69,
74 (2015).
60. Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity,
102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 382 (2012).
61. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE COAL., UTILITY 2.0: PILOTING THE FUTURE FOR
MARYLAND’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND THEIR CUSTOMERS 10 (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/Berliner/Resources/Files/efc_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5THZ-HULF]; Klass & Wilson, supra note 59, at 75 (describing
how advanced metering allows for “set and forget” commands that program “air
conditioners, water heaters, or refrigerators . . . to automatically cycle in response
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to more actively control customer load during peak periods in
exchange for incentive payments. 62 Other consumers might
exit the grid entirely by backing up their distributed
generation with on-site energy storage to fulfill all their energy
needs. 63
In some states, the role of utilities in this new system
might be radically different. New York’s Public Service
Commission, for example, has begun a proceeding dedicated to
“Reforming the Energy Vision,” under which utilities will
become “Distributed System Platform providers” that facilitate
and coordinate consumer offerings to the grid. 64 Under this
model, utilities’ primary job will be to create a platform where
consumers can bid into a central market any local generation
(such as excess energy from rooftop solar), energy storage
potential, or ability to cut demand for which they would like to
receive payment. The utility’s job will then be to organize and
deploy all cost-effective consumer-side offerings. 65 Once
systems like this are in place, an urban dweller might buy not
only her produce but also her electricity from a trusted farmer
down the road. 66
Outside of this leading group of states, regulators are less
to system signals or pre-set price points.”); Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid:
Technology and the Psychology of Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 139, 140 (2011) (describing a potential future in which imploring behavior
change is abandoned “in favor of sophisticated default- and preference-setting and
integrated external control of residential electricity.”).
62. Cf. AHMAD FARUQUI, RYAN HLEDIK & JENNIFER PALMER, REGULATORY
ASSISTANCE PROJECT & BRATTLE GRP. GLOB., TIME-VARYING AND DYNAMIC RATE
DESIGN 6 (2012), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapfaruquihledikpalmer-timevaryingdynamicratedesign-2012-jul-23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7EV-HWQK] (arguing that the real promise of dynamic pricing
lies in the ability of system operators to run an improved system rather than in
individualized consumer responses to price fluctuations).
63. On-site energy storage would likely take the form of batteries capable of
storing energy during times of over-supply and releasing that energy for
consumption during times of high demand. See PETER BRONSKI ET AL., THE
ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION: WHEN AND WHERE DISTRIBUTED SOLAR
GENERATION PLUS STORAGE COMPETES WITH TRADITIONAL UTILITY SERVICE 6
(2014).
64. N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 2.
65. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the
Energy Vision, 329 P.U.R.4th 1, 37–39, 41–42 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, May 19,
2016) (order).
66. See Matthew Crosby, An Airbnb or Uber for the Electricity Grid?, RMI
BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_09_02_an_airbnb_or_uber_for_
the_electricity_grid [https://perma.cc/QHX5-89CA]; see also Eisen, supra note 14
(laying out a proposal for FERC to create a nationwide platform of this sort).
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likely to articulate this kind of comprehensive vision of a
participatory, consumer-centric grid. And in all states, it
remains the case that significant investments in new, largescale infrastructure will be critical in the clean energy
transition. 67 Nevertheless, all states have in place at least
some policies aimed at inducing consumers to more actively
participate in their energy management, with net metering and
energy efficiency policies being the most widespread. 68 States
where the electricity industry remains “vertically integrated,”
such that the same company owns and manages generation,
transmission, and distribution under public utility commission
oversight, may be less inclined to adopt a full-throated version
of the participatory grid than their counterparts that have
more fully opened their electricity sectors up to competition. 69
But these reforms are penetrating even many states with more
traditional regulatory structures, 70 suggesting that the
participatory grid may be a change poised to sweep the nation.

67. Necessary upgrades just to the U.S. transmission and distribution grid
are estimated to be in the range of $50 billion per year over the next two decades.
See CHRIS NEME & RICH SEDANO, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, US
EXPERIENCE WITH EFFICIENCY AS A TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
RESOURCE i (2014), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapneme-efficiencyasatanddresource-2012-feb-14.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/SBU9H3SD]. Any money that states choose to spend on pursuing new nuclear power,
carbon capture and storage, or utility-scale renewable energy is additional to this
basic infrastructure spending.
68. See, e.g., DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2015) [https://perma.cc/
Y6EZ-XUVQ].
69. For a thorough description of the different state models of utility
regulation in the United States, see Boyd & Carlson, supra note 42, at 835–39.
Frank Wolak does a good job describing why restructured states might find
demand-side management—i.e., participatory grid solutions—particularly
important, as their market prices will benefit from the increased competition that
low-cost, demand-side solutions provide. See Frank A. Wolak, Regulating
Competition in Wholesale Electricity Supply, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH (Nancy Rose ed., 2014), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12567.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WYM6-8JVS]. In traditional, vertically integrated states, where
generation costs are bundled into overall rates, generation pricing is less visible
and less subject to market manipulation, creating less pressure on regulators to
implement demand-side solutions. See id. at 210–11.
70. Minnesota, California, and Hawaii, for example, retain traditionally
regulated retail sectors but are considering or implementing sweeping reforms
along the lines of a participatory grid. See supra note 52.
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Is This Really Participation?

There are at least two reasons one might be skeptical of
the participatory grid vision. The first is practical: it is not
clear that overextended Americans want to invest more time in
redesigning their electricity systems or interfacing with their
utility companies. This concern is legitimate, but is addressed
to a certain extent by the vision itself: in speaking of
“participation,” regulators do not intend to actively engage
consumers on an hour-to-hour basis, such that they continually
rejigger their electricity consumption in response to changing
prices. Instead, much of this system is likely to be automated:
smart thermostats will send automatic signals to household
appliances indicating when they should shut off and on, based
on pricing data, and utilities might be granted remote control
over certain consumer-side functions (such as cycling air
conditioners off and on) in exchange for incentive payments.71
And much of the coordination of these tasks might occur not at
the consumer level, but instead at the “aggregator” level—that
is, third parties who construct a business model on the ability
to contract with consumers to manage their energy supply. 72
The participatory grid is thus participatory only in the
sense that consumer-side offerings will become a standard
component of the larger grid and electricity marketplace, and
participating consumers will reap the attendant financial
benefits and the psychological satisfaction of knowing that they
are contributing to a cleaner energy system. This conception of
participation is likely to be pragmatically achievable. But it
creates a second potential problem by narrowing the concept of
the term “participation” as it is commonly understood in our
democratic tradition. 73 The new vision for the grid is not one in
which citizens come together, deliberate their energy
71. See supra note 61.
72. Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority Over
Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 76 (2013) (explaining the role and expertise of
aggregators).
73. Contrast this vision with, for example, Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright,
Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE 5 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) (calling for “active
political involvement of the citizenry” and “political consensus through dialogue”);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (similar).

9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

590

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/10/2017 7:27 PM

[Vol. 88

preferences, and settle upon forms of collective action to
promote decarbonization. Instead, the vision focuses
specifically on individuals as consumers, and capitalizes on the
desire to save money as the primary impetus for grid
participation. 74 Moreover, the model does not even ask
consumers to exert much effort in the market domain, given
the automation expected to dominate the process.
There are compelling reasons for regulators to promote
this type of participation. Individuals contribute approximately
one-third of all carbon dioxide emissions in the United States,
amounting to roughly eight percent of the world’s total
emissions. 75 Incentivizing individual behavioral changes may
therefore be important in the fight against climate change. 76
And financially incentivizing (automated) right action on
climate change may be particularly important. It is hard to
instill an ethic that turning on a light, or driving to visit a
friend, is “wrong” per se, 77 even though these small actions
collectively create much of the problem. Financial incentives
and technological fixes help eliminate the need for difficult
appeals to conscience. Additionally, a model that relies on
consumer incentives avoids some of climate change’s political
challenges. In place of moral appeals, a consumer-based model
allows even climate skeptics to choose to adopt participatory
grid technologies purely for their cost-saving potential. 78
But a focus on this narrow, market-centric version of
participation also has downsides. Many scholars believe that
“people hold and express different preferences in their
74. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 527
(2004) (“For better or worse . . . the market and the consumer are central to public
policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.”).
75. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1672, 1677 (2007); Dietz et al., supra note 43, at
18452 (finding that behavioral changes could cut “20% of household direct
emissions or 7.4% of US national emissions, with little or no reduction in
household well-being”).
76. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 75, at 1675.
77. See DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGES FAILED—AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 7
(2014) (“Even most of us who care deeply about climate change would have to
admit . . . that we do not feel like killers when we fly or drive.”).
78. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115,
118, 145 (2007) (advocating “expressive overdetermination” in laws and policies,
which makes them susceptible to multiple cultural interpretations and thereby
enhances their appeal).
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‘consumer’ role and in their ‘citizen’ role,” 79 and may act more
benevolently in their role as citizens than as consumers. 80 If
this is true, then a participatory grid focused largely on
empowering consumers qua consumers—and with as little
personal effort as possible—may miss opportunities for
engaging Americans in the struggle against climate change in
more meaningful and impactful ways. 81
I find this critique of the dominant participatory grid
vision compelling, and will return to discuss it further in Part
IV of this Article. For now, however, I want to set it aside and
focus specifically on the participatory grid’s equity problem—
that is, on distributional disparities in the ability of Americans
to become a part of the vision as it exists now. The remainder
of this section explores in detail the equity implications of
several of the most prevalent participatory grid policies: net
metering, smart meters and dynamic pricing, and the
promotion of electric vehicle infrastructure and energy storage.
Collectively, these policies—widely celebrated as promising
approaches to achieving clean energy 82—risk creating a new
problem of clean energy justice.

79. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and
the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 378 (1998)
80. See id. at 378–79 (discussing the various scholars who make this
assertion); Kysar, supra note 74, at 636 (same).
81. Cf. Benjamin R. Barber, A Failure of Democracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/29/opinion/a-failure-ofdemocracy-not-capitalism.html [https://perma.cc/D323-SDVQ] (arguing that “we
have diminished the power of the public sphere” in favor of “a private liberty that
allows us to work and prosper individually”); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FIRST AS TRAGEDY,
THEN AS FARCE 34, 52 (2009) (expressing skepticism about “cultural capitalism,”
wherein “the capitalist mobilization of a society’s productive capacity can also be
made to serve ecological goals, the struggle against poverty, and other worthy
ends”). But see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 75, at 1723 (arguing that
it is “equally likely” that individuals who undertake market actions to reduce
carbon “will become more supportive of government regulation”).
82. See generally Priya Barua, Letha Tawney & Lutz Weischer, Delivering on
the Green Economy: The Role of Policy in Developing Successful Domestic Solar
and Wind Industries (World. Res. Inst., Working Paper 2012),
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/delivering_clean_energy_economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RC5-WQPF]; Severin Borenstein, Michael Jaske & Arthur
Rosenfeld, Dynamic Pricing, Advanced Metering, and Demand Response in
Electricity Markets (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working Paper 105, 2002),
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/11w8d6m4 [https://perma.cc/4ZS7-APHA]; PAUL
DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, THE ROLE OF ENERGY
STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION (Jan. 2010),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ZT-EEUM].
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B. Net Metering
The rooftop solar panel might seem to beautifully evoke
the American ideal of self-sufficiency. In reality, solar panels
have required substantial policy and grid support to become
viable in most places. 83 As noted earlier, forty-four states and
the District of Columbia use net metering to foster solar panel
growth. 84 This policy allows customers to draw power from the
grid when necessary, while permitting them to sell their solar
power into the grid when their home produces excess power.85
The “net” aspect of the policy comes from the fact that the
transactions are monitored by a single meter, which counts
upwards when the consumer is drawing in grid power, and
back downwards when the consumer is providing power to the
grid. Net metering’s popularity is largely due to its simplicity.
Customers easily understand the concept of “running the meter
backwards,” and the policy avoids federal-state jurisdictional
complications that exist at the intersection of wholesale and
retail power. 86 Net metering is also effective: because it makes
investment in solar panels pay off relatively quickly, it has
been one of the key policy drivers of the recent solar “boom.” 87
But in recent years, opponents have launched a nationwide
assault on the policy, 88 which has gained particular traction in
83. See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, REGULATORY
CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED
SOLAR 3 (Nov. 2013) (cataloguing the range of support policies for solar energy).
84. See text accompanying supra note 6.
85. See id.
86. See Steven Ferrey, Nothing but Net: Renewable Energy and the
Environment, Midamerican Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2003) (describing how the “state/federal struggle over
net metering replays seventy years of federalism’s jurisdictional friction regarding
electric power development”).
87. Solar production has doubled annually every year since 2009, and in
leading states like California and Hawaii, it has climbed to one or two percent of
overall energy. However, it remains less than 0.1 percent of the energy mix in a
majority of states (31). See Solar Energy Industries Association Fact Sheet, “Net
Metering By State” (Nov. 2012), http://www.seia.org/research-resources/netmetering-state [https://perma.cc/A6S3-BXBA]. At the end of 2012, 99 percent of
installed solar PV was on net metering tariffs. BIRD ET AL., supra note 83, at 33.
88. One 2016 study found that “[i]n 2015, regulators, lawmakers, or utilities
in at least forty-six states studied, proposed, or enacted policy changes pertaining
to net metering, valuation of distributed solar, fixed or solar charges, third-party
or utility-led rooftop solar ownership, or community solar . . .”. Twenty-seven
states specifically considered or enacted changes to net metering in 2015. N.C.
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER, 2015 POLICY REVIEW Q4 REPORT, 50
STATES OF SOLAR, 11, 14 (Feb. 2016), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-
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content/uploads/ 50sosQ4-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXJ5-GCYJ]. Regarding
specific state debates, see, for example, Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for
Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/
business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-it-yourselfpower.html [https://perma.cc/X553-EM57] (detailing Arizona’s and California’s
debates in particular); Thomas Content, Green-power, Low-Energy Users Get
Brunt of Utility Rate Increase, MILWAUKEE-WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL (Jan 5, 2013),
http://archive.jsonline.com/business/greenpower-lowenergy-users-get-brunt-ofutility-rate-increase-6e88n4n-185771321.html
[https://perma.cc/MDZ7-N3MK]
(reporting that Wisconsin commission approved a twenty percent increase in the
fixed portion of utility rates); Donna Bryson, Contentious Solar Energy Issue
Raised
in
Colorado,
WASH.
TIMES
(Mar.
12,
2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/12/contentious-solar-energyissue-raised-in-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/89ZJ-4AR7]; In the matter of the
Application of Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. for Approval of Its 2014 Renewable Energy
Standard Compliance Plan, 13A-0836E, 2015 WL 7424163 (Colo. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Nov. 10, 2015); Cathy Proctor, Xcel Energy and Solar Power Backers
Broker Deal for 2014 Solar Rewards, DENVER BUS. J. (May 6, 2014),
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/earth_to_power/2014/05/xcel-energy-andsolar-power-backers-broker-deal.html?utm_source%3Dfeedburner%26utm_
medium%3Dfeed%26utm_campaign%3DFeed%253A%2Bindustry_5%2B(Industry
%2BEnergy%2B%2526%2Bthe%2BEnvironment [https://perma.cc/G2CG-YUKJ];
Press Release, Hawaiian Electric, Hawaiian Electric Companies Propose Plan to
Sustainably Increase Rooftop Solar (Jan. 20, 2015) (on file with author) (proposing
to reduce amount paid to new solar customers); Passera Laurel, Idaho PSC
Improves Net Metering Rules of Idaho Power, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY
COUNCIL: NEWS (July 10, 2013), http://www.irecusa.org/2013/07/idaho-pscimproves-net-metering-rules-for-idaho-power/
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-5DVK];
Karen Uhlenhuth, In Defeat for ALEC, Kansas Lawmakers Pass Net Metering
Plan, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/
2014/04/07/in-defeat-for-alec-kansas-lawmakers-pass-net-metering-plan/
[https://perma.cc/B8Y9-Z4RN]; Examination of the Comprehensive Costs and
Benefits of Net Metering in Louisiana No. X-33192 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar.
28, 2014); Order Approving Distributed Solar Value Methodology, No. E999/M-1465 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 1, 2014); Order Granting Rehearing in Part,
Establishing Transition Plan, and Making Other Findings, Nos. 14-E-0151 & 14E-0422 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 17, 2015); Sean Whaley, Review Proposed
for Rates of Homeowners Who Install Solar Systems, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (June 16,
2014),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/review-proposed-rates-homeownerswho-install-solar-systems [https://perma.cc/AWF8-3FBE]; Paul Monies, Oklahoma
House Passes Solar Surcharge Bill, OKLAHOMAN (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://newsok.com/article/3955378 [https://perma.cc/QS6P-FNTJ]; Distributed
Energy Resource Program Act, No. 236 of 2014, Docket No. 2014-246-E, (S.C. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n Dec. 11, 2014) (order approving settlement agreement); Garrett
Hering, West Virginia Governor Approves Previously Vetoed Net Metering Bill,
P.V.
MAG.
(Mar.
16,
2015),
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/
details/beitrag/west-virginia-governor-approves-previously-vetoed-net-meteringbill-_100018604/#axzz4PAH3KpWY [https://perma.cc/937T-62EK]; Roy L. Hales,
Utilities Try to Harness Net Metering in Washington State, CLEAN TECHNICA
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://cleantechnica.com/2014/03/17/utilities-try-harness-netmetering-washington-state/ [https://perma.cc/F4R8-M3HD]; Kari Lydersen, In
Wisconsin, Solar ‘New Math’ Could Equal Big Impacts, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS
(Jan. 16, 2015), http://midwestenergynews.com/2015/01/16/in-wisconsin-solar-new-
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states such as Arizona where solar panels are most popular. 89
Opponents assert that consumers with solar panels are “free
riding” off the grid: by running the meter backwards,
sometimes all the way to zero, net metering allows them to
escape from paying their fair share of grid maintenance costs,
even though they rely on the grid’s services whenever they are
under- or over-producing power. 90 Some utilities have alleged
that the cost-shift from net-metered to non-net-metered
customers may be as high as $1000 per residential net-metered
system, and have argued that net-metered customers should
pay special charges to compensate for their added costs. 91 This
“free riding”—or, more accurately, cross-subsidization—
appears particularly egregious when coupled with statistics
showing that predominantly wealthier consumers put solar
panels on their roofs. 92 As these consumers enjoy the benefits
math-could-equal-big-impacts/ [https://perma.cc/XTH5-S7SH].
89. See TOM STANTON, NAT’L REG. RES. INST., REPORT NO. 13–07 STATE AND
UTILITY SOLAR ENERGY PROGRAMS: RECOMMENDED APPROACHES FOR GROWING
MARKETS iv (July 2013) (suggesting that net metering reform will become
increasingly pressing as solar’s growth continues); see also NAÏM R DARGHOUTH,
GALEN BARBOSE, & RYAN WISER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., LNVL-6017E,
ELECTRICITY BILL SAVINGS FROM RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS:
SENSITIVITIES TO CHANGES IN FUTURE ELECTRICITY MARKET CONDITIONS viii
(Jan. 2013).
90. See, e.g., AZ Net Metering Decision, supra note 9, at 6 (describing Arizona
utility’s concern that non-participants in net metering schemes shouldered a
disproportionate share of grid maintenance costs). Utilities recover some grid
maintenance costs through “fixed” portions of utility bills that all consumers
(including net-metered customers) pay, but most utilities recover more than half
of fixed costs through volumetric electricity rates. See Griselda Blackburn, Clare
Magee & Varun Rai, Solar Valuation and the Modern Utility’s Expansion into
Distributed Generation, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 26 (2014); see also Frank A. Felder
& Rasika Athawale, The Life and Death of the Utility Death Spiral, 27
ELECTRICITY J. 9 (2014); Ryan Hledik, Rediscovering Residential Demand
Charges, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 82, 84 (2014).
91. See AZ Net Metering Decision, supra note 9, at 6.
92. One 2013 California study found that whereas the median California
household income is $54,283, the average median household income of customers
installing net-metered systems since 1999 was $91,210. See ENERGY AND ENVTL.
ECON., INC., INTRODUCTION TO THE CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING
RATEPAYER IMPACTS EVALUATION 11 (Oct. 28, 2013). A smaller 2011 study of San
Diego and Sacramento revealed that the median income for neighborhoods with at
least one solar panel system was 84 percent higher than for neighborhoods with
no solar. Samuel Dastrup et al., Understanding the Solar Home Price Premium:
Electricity Generation and “Green” Social Status 20 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 17200, July 2011). The growth of third-party leasing,
where a homeowner contracts with a company that agrees to install and maintain
solar panels on their home, is likely to lessen the regressive nature of net
metering by eliminating up-front infrastructure costs for homeowners. See Jason
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of self-generation, lower-income consumers who cannot afford
solar panels are left shouldering a rising proportion of grid
maintenance costs.
In contrast, net metering proponents insist that
distributed solar generation provides substantial benefits to
the grid, thereby lowering overall grid costs for all consumers,
such that solar customers aren’t cross-subsidized. In fact, they
might even be getting underpaid by net metering for the energy
that they supply to the grid. 93 Frustratingly for regulators,
empirical evidence does not provide conclusive answers to this
debate. Most studies show that average retail rates—at which
net-metered customers are credited—approximate the value of
solar to the grid, with about half of the studies finding that
solar is underpaid, and the other half finding that solar is
overpaid. 94 These divergent results point to a deeper challenge
in framing this equity debate as an empirical question. The
results depend heavily on the values measured: when solar
energy’s environmental and social benefits are included within
a study, its overall value predictably rises considerably. 95 But
whether to include these external benefits within solar’s grid
R. Wiener & Christian Alexander, On-site Renewable Energy and Public Finance:
How and Why Municipal Bond Financing is the Key to Propagating Access to OnSite Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 559, 566 (2010). But third-party leasing cannot change the fact that
over two-thirds of American residences aren’t solar-appropriate. See Samantha
Booth, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations Cast a Shadow on the
Growth of Community Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. REV. 760, 767
(2014).
93. Solar energy can lower energy and capacity costs that utilities would
otherwise incur; reduce the need for investments in transmission and distribution
infrastructure; act as a fuel price hedge to natural gas or coal; provide resilience
to the grid by decentralizing generation; reduce conventional air pollutants,
carbon emissions, and water and land use; and improve economic development by
providing more local jobs and tax revenue. But precisely valuing these benefits
remains controversial. See Travis Bradford & Anne Hoskins, Valuing Distributed
Energy: Economic and Regulatory Challenges 13–14 (Princeton Roundtable,
Working Paper, 2013).
94. Laura Hansen et al., A Review of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies 22
(Rocky Mountain Institute, 2d ed. Sept. 2013) (meta-study reviewing seventeen
recent studies of solar’s value to the grid) [hereinafter RMI DG Study]. See also
STANTON, supra note 89, at 22 (reviewing existing studies of solar’s costs and
benefits and reaching similar conclusions about the trends in these studies).
However, as the RMI DG Study cautions, average retail rates cannot perfectly
measure whether solar is appropriately compensated by net metering, because
this determination depends on the particular tariff utilized by the net-metered
customer. See id. at 22.
95. See STANTON, supra note 89, at 22.
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valuation turns on the question of what values regulators want
ratepayers to fund. This question is fraught: While the societal
benefits of solar may be considerable, it is not clear whether
remaining grid customers, as opposed to society as a whole,
should shoulder the costs of attaining solar’s non-monetized
environmental benefits.
State regulators have adopted divergent responses to these
complex equity considerations. In 2014, Arizona imposed
special charges on solar customers 96 and Wisconsin increased
the fixed portion of all utility bills. 97 In late 2015, Nevada chose
to suspend its net metering program, prompting a crash of its
solar industry. 98 Most states have taken a more cautious
approach, demanding closer empirical scrutiny before
reforming net metering. 99 An increasingly popular policy option
is the “value of solar tariff,” which attempts to more precisely
compensate solar owners for the value of the energy they
produce to the grid, while charging them separately for the
power they draw from the grid. 100 Technical solutions like this
96. See, e.g., AZ Net Metering Decision, supra note 9 (Commissioner Burns,
dissenting) (imposing a per-kilowatt of solar capacity charge that will amount to
$4.90 on average per solar customer per month).
97. Application of Wisc. Pub. Serv. Corp. for Authority to Adjust Electric and
Natural Gas Rates, No. 6690-UR-123, 2014 WL 7398755, 39–54 (Wisc. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n Dec. 18, 2014) (final decision) (raising fixed charges on all customers); see
also Thomas Content, Regulators Agree to Increase Fixed Charge on WE Energies
Electric
Bills,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(Nov.
14,
2014),
http://archive.jsonline.com/business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-ratehike-plan-b99390765z1-282726581.html [https://perma.cc/M6Z7-PF5Q] (reporting
that the decision will raise the fixed portion of bills from around $9 to $16 per
month).
98. See Ivan Penn, SolarCity to Leave Nevada After PUC Cuts Rooftop Solar
Benefits, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fisolarcity-nevada-rooftop-20151223-story.html
[https://perma.cc/YA6D-9QSA];
Chris Nelder & Mark Dyson, Rocky Mountain Inst., Nevada, Previously a Solar
Leader, Shutters its Residential Rooftop Market, RMI BLOG (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2016_01_15_nevada_shutters_its_residential_rooftop_
market [https://perma.cc/54WE-F7F8].
99. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2514m, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (ordering
commission to evaluate “who benefits from, and who bears the economic burden, if
any, of the net energy metering program”); Assemb. B. 8557, 237th Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2013) (similar).
100. See CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, MINN. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA
VALUE OF SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (Apr. 1, 2014), http://mn.gov/commerce/energy/
images/MN-VOS-Methodology-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/VEA4-VHE5] (adopting a
“Value of Solar Methodology” that utilities can use in place of net metering).
Minnesota’s program is modeled off of a similar effort by the municipal utility in
Austin, Texas. See CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, AUSTIN ENERGY, 2014 VALUE OF
SOLAR AT AUSTIN ENERGY 2 (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/
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will be important for appropriately compensating solar
customers without escalating costs for remaining ratepayers,
but they do not go the full distance in remedying equity
concerns. Even if solar owners are accurately compensated,
there remains the question of whether we are comfortable with
the marketplace determining which consumers become a part
of the distributed generation movement, and which do not.
C. Smart Meters, the Smart Grid, and Dynamic Pricing
The smart grid and smart meters hold considerable
promise for helping to make the grid more efficient, as these
technologies will allow much more accurate and time-sensitive
tracking and management of electricity supply and demand. 101
However, they also raise significant equity concerns, largely
due to the potential pricing changes they enable. 102 The
installation of around fifty million smart meters in
approximately 43 percent of U.S. households 103 has caused
many scholars and regulators to push for changes in electricity
pricing. 104 Right now, the vast majority of consumers pay a flat
rate per kilowatt-hour for their electricity even though the
costs of generating power fluctuate considerably over the
course of a day and a year. 105 “Dynamic pricing” refers to a
document.cfm?id=199131 [perma.cc/3ZJR-EBJD]. See also NAT’L ASSN. OF
REGULATORY UTILITY COMM’RS., DRAFT MANUAL ON DISTRIBUTED ENERGY
RESOURCES COMPENSATION (2016), http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/88954963-0F01F4D9-FBA3-AC9346B18FB2 [perma.cc/4B8H-B9LY] (setting forth various options
for reforming rate design to account for the costs and benefits of integrating
distributed energy resources into the grid).
101. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
102. BARBARA ALEXANDER, SMART METERS, REAL TIME PRICING, AND DEMAND
RESPONSE PROGRAMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW INCOME ELECTRIC CUSTOMERS 4
(2007). Opponents have also raised privacy and health concerns against smart
meters. See generally Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information:
The Promise and Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual
Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1566 (2012); Smart Meter Health
Complaints,
EMF
Safety
Network,
http://emfsafetynetwork.org/smartmeters/smart-meter-health-complaints/
(last
visited
Nov.
21,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/QR3Z-YQZZ]; Sonia McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 199 (2011); Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of
Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (2011).
103. EDISON ELEC. INST., UTILITY-SCALE SMART METER DEPLOYMENT:
BUILDING BLOCK OF THE ELECTRIC POWER GRID 1 (2014).
104. See Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In
Residential Dynamic Electricity Pricing, 42 REV. IND. ORGAN. 127, 127 (2013);
Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 381–83.
105. See Borenstein, Jaske & Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 5.
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range of rate design reforms that would better align retail
electricity pricing with the price fluctuations that occur in
wholesale electricity markets. 106 These reforms would make
retail rates more expensive during peak demand periods, such
as early evenings on hot summer days, while dramatically
lowering them during periods when supply is high but demand
is low, such as late-night wind surges. Reforms might take the
form of real-time pricing, where customers pay a retail rate
directly linked to the wholesale price of electricity; time-of-use
rates, which employ several different pricing levels for different
times of day; or critical peak pricing, which prices certain
particularly expensive hours much higher (generally 100-200
hours per year). 107 These pricing reforms help consumers
understand, through market signals, how to participate
effectively in energy markets. 108
Spurred by federal funding, 109 many states and localities
have run pilot programs to experiment with dynamic pricing
options. 110 These experiments—and the possibility they augur
that dynamic pricing could become a commonplace mandatory
or default pricing option 111—have prompted a staunch equity
backlash. 112 Opponents worry that such schemes will
disproportionately harm low-income consumers because the
106. See id. at 5–7.
107. See AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY WHITE PAPER,
THE IMPACT OF DYNAMIC PRICING ON LOW INCOME CONSUMERS 4–5 (Sept. 2010).
108. Ahmad Faruqui, The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 13, 13
(2010) (reviewing several studies finding that dynamic pricing might reduce peak
consumption from ten to fourteen percent).
109. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115; Eisen, supra note 57, at 18 (explaining that “[f]ederal funds
defraying half the cost” made smart grid projects more appealing to state
commissions).
110. See Theresa Flaim et al., Pilot Paralysis: Why Dynamic Pricing Remains
Over-Hyped and Underachieved, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 8, 10 (2013).
111. Few states seem willing to mandate dynamic pricing for all customers
without an opt-out. However, default dynamic pricing is likely to capture a
majority of customers: “the limited literature on the topic suggests that about 80
percent would stay on dynamic pricing if it is offered as the default rate . . . .”
AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE POWER OF FIVE PERCENT:
HOW DYNAMIC PRICING CAN SAVE $35 BILLION IN ELECTRICITY COSTS 4 (May
2007). In contrast, voluntary dynamic pricing schemes requiring opt-in have seen
very low uptake. See Stefanie A. Brand, Dynamic Pricing for Residential Electric
Customers: A Ratepayer Advocate’s Perspective, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 50, 52 (2010).
112. See, e.g., AARP, National Consumer Law Center, and Public Citizen,
Comment on Smart Grid RFI: Addressing Policy and Logistical Options (2010),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/AARPNCLCPublic_
CitizenCommentsDOE1101.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9PU-6AYQ].
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class of low-income consumers disproportionately includes the
elderly, those out of work, and those at home caring for
children. 113 These consumers may not be able to cut demand
during peak periods as easily as those fully employed outside of
the home. 114 Furthermore, low-income consumers may have
the least ability to make investments in thermostats and
automated appliances that help control the timing of energy
use. 115
As in the net metering debate, regulators take these equity
concerns seriously. Even though experts view dynamic pricing
as one of the most effective reforms for promoting more
rational energy use, regulators hesitate to employ it: a 2010
survey found that only one percent of residential customers are
on time-of-use rates, while very few utilities even offer realtime pricing. 116 Regulators remain resistant to these reforms
predominantly because of worries about how dynamic pricing
might redistribute costs among consumers. 117
Like net metering, dynamic pricing’s equity impacts are
less certain than its opponents fear. Current electricity rates
contain a hidden (although long-accepted) cross-subsidy: those
who use less energy at peak times are subsidizing those who
use more. 118 Because the poor do not typically consume a larger
share of their power during peak hours, 119 and may actually
consume less during peak periods, dynamic pricing might
produce a progressive shift in rate design, immediately
lowering most low-income consumers’ bills. 120
113. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 17; Brand, supra note 111, at 52.
114. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 17; Brand, supra note 111, at 52.
115. See Barbara R. Alexander, Dynamic Pricing? Not So Fast! A Residential
Consumer Perspective, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 39, 43 (2010).
116. Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 382.
117. Id. at 384; see also, e.g., In the Matter of the Application of Baltimore Gas
and Elec. Co. for Authorization to Deploy a Smart Grid Initiative and to Establish
a Surcharge for the Recovery of Cost, No. 9208, Order No. 83410, at 6 (Md. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n June 21, 2010) (rejecting utility’s application for a smart grid
program in part because the Commission was “persuaded that some of the
Company’s most vulnerable residential customers . . . are less likely to realize the
potential benefits of [time-of-use] pricing than would the ‘average’ residential
customer”).
118. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 19–20.
119. Borenstein, supra note 104, at 139.
120. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 17 fig.9 (meta-review of seventy dynamic
pricing studies from around the country). Faruqui found that dynamic pricing is
likely to immediately lower bills for two-thirds to three-quarters of all customers.
Id. at 16; see also FARUQUI ET AL., supra note 107 (examining five dynamic pricing
schemes from around the U.S. and reaching similar conclusions).
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However, there is a rival consideration when it comes to
the equity of dynamic pricing: the long term impacts of a
pricing change may be even more significant than its
immediate impacts, especially in a world where electricity
prices are likely to rise over time. To understand the impacts of
dynamic pricing policies that are expected to endure and
perhaps become more stringent over time, it matters
considerably whether consumers will be able to make changes
in the time of their electricity consumption in order to manage
their bills. The evidence of low-income consumers’ ability to
adapt to dynamic pricing signals is mixed: while there is some
evidence that low-income consumers respond well, 121 other
studies have shown that higher-income households are more
responsive. 122 And irrespective of immediate responsiveness,
there is a longer-term risk associated with the increasingly
important role that costly new technologies are likely to play in
load management over time. If these technologies remain out of
reach for low-income consumers, then they will be less able to
manage spikes in their loads that occur during periods of high
demand, causing increased bill volatility and higher prices.123
Thus again, empirical studies may prove useful but not
determinative in debates over dynamic pricing schemes, given
the inability of such studies to make the value judgments
necessary to balance short-term benefits and long-term
concerns. To date, the empirical evidence has not persuaded
regulators: although pilots abound, no state has moved to
mandatory dynamic pricing, and very few utilities even offer
opt-out programs that make dynamic pricing the default. 124
121. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 22–23 (reviewing a D.C. study of a critical
peak pricing rebate program that found that low-income consumers were two
times more likely to respond than other consumers); see also FARUQUI ET AL.,
supra note 107, at 21 (finding no measurable difference in response based on
income).
122. Ahmad Faruqui & Stephen George, Quantifying Customer Response to
Dynamic Pricing, 18 ELECTRICITY J. 53, 56 (2005) (finding that college-educated
households and households with higher incomes are twice as responsive to
dynamic pricing as low-income households).
123. See, e.g., Lisa Wood & Ahmad Faruqui, Better Data, New Conclusions,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2011, at 47, 47 (2011) (“[L]ow-income consumers did
respond to dynamic pricing, but in most cases their rate of price responsiveness
was lower than that for non-low-income consumers.”); Flaim et al., supra note
110, at 18 (finding that the response was 3.5 times larger when control
technologies accompanied dynamic pricing).
124. A May 2015 Washington Post article reported that out of 50 million
smart-metered customers, only eight million have access to any kind of “smart
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D. Energy Storage and Electric Vehicles
Energy storage and electric vehicles present largely
untapped but significant possibilities for grid participation.
Energy storage 125 is emerging triumphant from years of slow
technological progress as it gains in affordability. 126 Buoyed by
these advancements, California recently became the first state
to impose an energy storage mandate on its utilities, requiring
them to procure 1,325 megawatts of energy storage by 2020 in
an effort to create a market for storage and further drive down
its costs. 127 Ratepayers will bear the costs of procuring this
storage. 128
Ratepayer funding of this program has proven
controversial, in part because storage remains a relatively
experimental technology with unproven benefits, but in part
due to more explicit equity concerns. 129 Energy storage has two
pricing” program, and considerably fewer actually use one. Chris Mooney, You
Should Be Saving Energy and Money on Hot Days This Summer. Here’s Why
You’re
(Probably)
Not,
WASH.
POST
(May
21,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/05/21/hotsummer-days-could-be-helping-you-save-energy-and-money-heres-why-theyreprobably-not/?utm_term=.da9fd6835a30 [https://perma.cc/ZZ9J-HP75]. California
is poised to become the first state to require its utilities to utilize default timevariant pricing. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Proposed Decision, supra note 54.
125. Energy storage can take many forms, including batteries, flywheels,
compressed air, and “pumped hydro,” where water is pumped up a hill during
periods of low demand and then used to generate power during periods of higher
demand. See Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case
for Energy Storage, 41 FL. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 697, 705–07 (2014).
126. See, e.g., John Vidal, Big Power Out, Solar In: Ubs Urges Investors to Join
Renewables Revolution, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2014/aug/27/ubs-investors-renewables-revolution [https://perma.cc/
98TD-ZR3X] (describing a recent UBS memo to investors predicting that by 2025,
everyone will be able to produce and store power cost-competitively due to
declining battery costs); Richard Fioravanti, Energy Storage: Out of the Lab and
Onto the Grid, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 2015, at 30, 33 (“In 2013 and 2014, utilities
issued more . . . announcements for megawatts of storage than in the past 30
years combined.”).
127. Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514 to
Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and Cost-Effective
Energy Storage Sys., D. 14-01-029, 2014 WL 252061, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Cal. Energy Storage Order].
128. Approving San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Pacific Gas & Electric
Company, and Southern California Edison Company’s Storage Procurement
Framework and Program, D. 14-10-045, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 16,
2014).
129. See Cal. Energy Storage Order, supra note 127, at 16 (discussing utilities’
filed comments that “the targets are very aggressive and will come at a high cost
to California ratepayers”).
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promising applications. First, storage might form a critical part
of a renewable energy-powered grid, as it could store energy
produced during periods of abundant sun and wind for release
during other times, thereby solving renewable energy’s
worrisome “intermittency” problem. 130 Second, storage might
act not as a grid stabilizer but as a grid replacement: if
distributed generation—that is, small-scale, locally-sited
generation—can be cost-effectively combined with storage, selfgenerating consumers will no longer have any need for the
grid. 131 This latter possibility presents similar but more severe
equity concerns than net metering. With affordable storage,
rich consumers might exit the grid altogether. 132 On a large
scale, such exit would radically change electricity’s social
infrastructure, decoupling wealthy consumers and large
businesses from the remainder of the population’s need for grid
stability and maintenance. 133 Whether or not mass grid exit is
likely depends on many unknown factors, including future
storage costs and regulatory strategies. 134 But its mere
possibility haunts discussions of policies promoting energy
storage.
A similar set of concerns animates the controversy over
130. Intermittency refers to the fact that renewable resources are
intermittently available based on weather conditions, rather than on stand-by to
respond to levels of customer demand. See JIM EYER & GARTH COREY, SANDIA
NAT’L LABS., ENERGY STORAGE FOR THE ELECTRICITY GRID: BENEFITS AND
MARKET POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE at xvi (2010).
131. See BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 6 (predicting that grid parity for
solar-plus-battery systems is “well within the 30-year planned economic life of
central power plants and transmission infrastructure”); see also Diane Cardwell,
Solar Power Battle Puts Hawaii at Forefront of Worldwide Changes, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/business/energy-environment/
solar-power-battle-puts-hawaii-at-forefront-of-worldwide-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/7E8L-ZBH4] (describing growing trend in Hawaii of installing
solar plus batteries).
132. See, e.g., NY REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 2 (“[T]he trend toward
affordability of self-generation threatens to create an unacceptable gap between
those who can choose to leave the grid and those who cannot, with implications for
the obligation to ensure reasonably priced and reliable service.”).
133. There is not yet empirical evidence on who precisely will exit the grid as
the combination of storage and on-site generation becomes a more viable economic
proposition, but one can surmise that, similar to solar panels, it is likely to be
those consumers able to afford the intensive up-front capital costs. On solar, see
supra note 92; on grid exit more generally, see BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 63.
134. RMI estimates the year in which distributed generation combined with
storage will reach “grid parity” (i.e., will cost the same as remaining connected to
the grid) in five states: pre-2014 (Hawaii); 2025 (New York); 2031 (California);
and 2047 (Kentucky and Texas). BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 fig.1.
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how to fund the construction of a robust electric vehicle (EV)
infrastructure, capable of coaxing car owners out of their oilfired cars and into grid-powered ones. After years of slow
progress by private companies, some states are considering
whether to permit their regulated utilities to take over the task
of building a public network of charging stations, with the costs
borne by utility ratepayers. 135 The move would serve the dual
purposes of “making the electric car a viable alternative for
millions of consumers” and “helping shore up [utilities’]
flattening business of supplying electricity.” 136 Again, however,
equity concerns loom large. In particular, ratepayer advocates
question whether it is “fair to burden the majority of . . .
ratepayers with building the network. . . .” 137 These fairness
concerns stem from two distinct sources: ratepayer advocates
question the certainty of the benefits that the public will derive
from investing in a charging station network, and also worry
that the benefits of this network are likely to accrue
predominantly to more affluent ratepayers, who will be more
likely to adopt EV technology. 138 Alongside determinations over
the extent to which ratepayers should fund charging networks,
public utility commissions will play an important role in
determining the rates customers pay for charging their EVs,
and the rates customers receive if their EVs function as grid
storage. 139 The compensation levels set for EVs acting as
batteries are likely to spur a debate similar to net metering,
regarding whether EVs should be rewarded above the level of
wholesale electricity prices for the benefits they provide to the
grid and beyond.
E. Whose Equity Concerns?
It would be naïve to think that deep and abiding concerns
over the fate of low-income consumers drive all of the equity
135. See Diane Cardwell, Utilities Push Into Fuel Stations for Electric Cars,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/utilitiespush-into-fuel-stations-for-electric-cars.html [https://perma.cc/M5ZZ-XADL]; see
also Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 371, 399–400 (2014) (describing the Oregon PUC’s hesitation to approve
ratepayer funding of EV infrastructure).
136. Cardwell, supra note 135.
137. See id.; see also Truong, supra note 41, at 495.
138. Truong, supra note 41, at 495.
139. Scott, supra note 135, at 399.
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arguments against clean energy policies. As mentioned in the
introduction, utilities frequently mount the strongest equity
arguments against these policies, 140 although consumer
advocates and other interest groups often join them. 141 And
utilities sometimes seem to be using equity arguments
opportunistically, given the fact that in opposing these clean
energy policies, they are centrally concerned with the impacts
the policies are likely to have on the utility business model.142
For example, in the case of net metering, if the policy does in
fact shunt more grid costs onto a smaller, poorer group of
consumers, then these price increases create incentives for
more customers to install distributed generation, which in turn
causes prices to rise even further. Some fear that this will
ultimately create a “utility death spiral,” with the remaining
customer base unable to support the costs of maintaining the
grid and the regulated business model failing. 143 Similar
concerns over revenue impacts animate utility opposition to
smart grid, dynamic pricing schemes, and energy storage—
140. EV infrastructure policies are an exception—utilities frequently support
these because such projects expand the demand for electricity. See Cardwell,
supra note 135.
141. See, e.g., STANTON, supra note 89, at 1 (noting that “[m]any interested
parties are sounding alarms,” although singling out utilities as taking a lead). For
its part, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) has included energy as a core civil rights issue in its agenda, and
supports net metering as “an opportunity to break fossil fuel company monopolies
that are actively resistant to transition, by offering options for consumers to
generate clean energy and drive this necessary transition.” Jacqueline Patterson,
Environmental
and
Climate
Justice
Director,
Energy
Democracy,
#BlackLivesMatter, and the NAACP Advocacy Agenda, Webinar on Net Metering
for Solar Advocates Hosted by the Energy Foundation (May 29, 2015),
http://www.naacp.org/latest/energy-democracy-blacklivesmatter-and-the-naacpadvocacy-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/G3ZW-JHY8]. Individual state chapters of the
NAACP have diverged, however, on their opinions with respect to net metering.
Compare, e.g., R. L. Nave, NAACP Calls for ‘Energy Justice’, JACKSON FREE
PRESS (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2013/dec/26/naacpcalls-energy-justice/ [https://perma.cc/8KPR-4QRY] (expressing Mississippi
NAACP Chapter’s support for net metering), with Evan Halper, Mintority Groups
Back Energy Companies in Fight Against Solar Power, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-solar-race-20150209-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2CS5-QR6Y] (describing Florida NAACP Chapter’s opposition to
net metering).
142. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 1675–82 (describing in more detail the
concerns over the sustainability of rate-of-return regulation); Graffy & Kihm,
supra note 14.
143. See PETER KIND, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL
ELECTRIC BUSINESS 6–9 (Jan. 2013); Graffy & Kihm, supra note 14.
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each of which has the possibility of harming utilities’
profitability under current regulatory regimes. 144
The fact that utilities so frequently filter their protectionist
concerns through discussions of equity, however, serves to
underscore its importance in electricity law: utilities make
these arguments because they are aware that regulators care
about the equities of clean energy policies. 145 Even so, the
messenger shapes the arguments made. In each of the cases
examined above, the right asserted on behalf of low-income
consumers is in opposition to progress on clean energy: a right
not to subsidize richer customers’ solar energy preferences; not
to face pricing schemes that increase bill volatility but reduce
carbon emissions; and not to pay extra to support experimental
technologies that the rich are likely to adopt first. To frame
these concerns in this way is not to suggest that they are
necessarily unreasonable demands. But it makes the equity
concerns with clean energy appear to be limited to ensuring
that no policies are adopted or persist that unfairly distribute
grid maintenance costs among consumers. In the following
parts, I suggest that this is a profoundly shortsighted way to
approach the question of how climate change, clean energy, and
equity interact.
It is not only utilities, however, that are guilty of
shortsighted approaches to clean energy and equity. Clean
energy advocates, skeptical of utilities’ motives in asserting
equity concerns, often respond by initiating an empirical battle,
seeking to debunk the validity of such concerns through better
studies and more precise valuation of clean energy policies’
benefits. 146 The empirical disagreements described above in the
cases of net metering and dynamic pricing are examples of this
phenomenon. This response is understandable, and this
evidence can be useful to commissions evaluating the merits of
equity claims. Identifying and addressing real cross144. Quinn and Reed adeptly explain why utilities may aggressively promote
only that part of the smart grid vision that poses no threat to their bottom line.
See Quinn & Reed, supra note 14, at 840–47. For reasons they observe, many
utilities will be natural opponents of smart grid policies aimed at inducing
strategic conservation of energy, such as smart meters and dynamic pricing. See
also Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 14, at 1531.
145. See KIND, supra note 143, at 1 (explaining how regulators’ concerns about
not overburdening low-income consumers who remain tied to the grid as prices
rise might ultimately lead to stranded costs that utilities will have to absorb).
146. See, e.g., supra notes 93–94.
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subsidization claims—and parsing these from other, selfinterested utility complaints—will certainly be one important
component of achieving clean energy justice.
However, responding piecemeal to narrow concerns about
the equity implications of particular policies misses the validity
of longer-term concerns about clean energy equity. These
concerns cannot be captured empirically or in the context of
any particular clean energy policy debate, but are nevertheless
vital questions about the future of energy in American society.
F. A More Holistic Conception of Clean Energy’s Equity
Problem
The debates highlighted above do not lend themselves to
easy conclusions regarding the equitability of particular clean
energy policies at particular points in time. But moving past
empiricism to long-term thinking, I believe clean energy’s
opponents have highlighted a potentially significant problem.
The suite of policies that makes up the participatory grid
portends a troubling future for electricity law’s commitment to
widespread affordability. Standing alone, participatory grid
policies may not pose an unequivocal threat to low-income
consumers, as there might not be that much to lose from nonparticipation. However, the likely interaction between
participatory grid policies and additional state and federal
policies presents particular cause for concern. Participatory
grid policies are just one component of the significant
transitional policies that climate experts agree will be
necessary to keep climate change to manageable levels. These
transitional policies are likely to require substantial
infrastructure investment, accompanied by a hefty price tag
that will be borne by those ratepayers still connected to the
grid and still drawing power during periods of high demand.
Meeting the world’s agreed-upon but non-binding goal of
keeping planetary warming below two degrees Celsuis 147—a
politically ambitious yet already ecologically questionable
147. See Framework Convention on Climate Change Draft Dec. -/CP.15,
Coppenhagen Accord, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2009). At the
2015 Paris climate change negotiations, delegates further agreed to attempt to
keep warming “well below” two degrees. Framework Convention on Climate
Change Draft Dec. -/CP.21, Paris Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, art. 2
(Dec. 12, 2015).
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aim 148—would require near total elimination of developed
country greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 149 The implications
for U.S. clean energy policy are twofold: First, we would have to
almost completely decarbonize our electricity sector, switching
to some mixture of renewable energy, fossil energy combined
with carbon capture and storage, and nuclear energy. 150
Second, the country would have to electrify several additional
sectors, most notably transportation and heating. 151 All told, if
the U.S. were to make good on its portion of the two-degree
commitment (an unlikely scenario, but a useful one for
understanding the scale of changes necessary), electricity
generation would need to approximately double by 2050, while
carbon emissions from electricity were reduced to three to ten
percent of current levels. 152 Even if pursued only half-heartedly
and as economically as possible, the necessary changes would
increase electricity bills for those customers who continue to
rely on the grid for their power. 153
In the face of these changes, state policies that focus on a
participatory grid as a decarbonization strategy present a
particular challenge. To become a part of this new grid requires
significant technological investment. A platform of solar
panels, smart grids, new appliances, electric vehicles, and selfstorage does not ring of egalitarianism, given the costs
148. See James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”:
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and
Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 2 (finding that “there are already clear
indications of undesirable impacts at the current level of warming and that 2°C
warming would have major deleterious consequences”).
149. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
150. Id. at xi (finding four plausible scenarios for decarbonization, which rely
either on high deployment of renewables, nuclear, carbon capture and storage, or
a “mixed case”).
151. Id. at xiii, 25 (finding in all decarbonization scenarios that the “use of
electricity and fuels produced from electricity increases from around 20% at
present to more than 50% by 2050”).
152. Id. at xii; see also STERN, supra note 23, at 238 (noting that stabilization
at any level of ultimate CO2 concentration will require reducing global emissions
by approximately 80 percent); WORKING GROUP III, supra note 23, at 20 (“In the
majority of low-stabilization scenarios, the share of low-carbon electricity
supply . . . increases from the current share of approximately 30% to more than
80% by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation without CCS is phased out almost
entirely by 2100.”).
153. Cf. STERN, supra note 23, at 212 (“Any costs to the economy of cutting
GHG emissions, like other costs, will ultimately be borne by households.
Emissions-intensive products will either become more expensive or impossible to
buy.”).
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involved, even if—and this is a critical, underappreciated
point—customers who remain tied to the grid are not unjustly
cross-subsidizing these technologies’ profusion. Even after all
cross-subsidies are eliminated, a focus on empowering
consumer action may leave low-income consumers, and even
plenty of “middle class” consumers, 154 isolated from these
changes.
Put differently, reforming participatory grid policies to
more precisely align costs with rates only addresses the
efficiency concerns raised by the participatory grid, by focusing
on achieving perfect distribution of costs as a method of
maximizing social welfare. 155 Within electricity law, this
principle is often called cost causation or the cost-price
standard: a belief that every person should pay precisely for
the costs she causes to the system. 156
But it is not clear that cost causation actually maximizes
welfare in the electricity context. Cost causation is justified by
the premise that keeping system costs as low as possible leaves
society, as a whole, the most additional wealth to devote to
other welfare enhancing endeavors. 157 And this premise, in
turn, depends upon the use of wealth as a proxy measure for
welfare. 158
Wealth maximization may be a particularly poor proxy for
welfare maximization in the context of electricity, where
distribution matters considerably. Access to a certain basic
quantity of electricity proves life-transformational and
foundational to societal engagement, as the history in the next
154. Cf. Patricia Cohen, Middle Class But Feeling Economically Insecure, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/business/economy/
middle-class-but-feeling-economically-insecure.html
[https://perma.cc/8LUYS8V3] (documenting the increasing economic vulnerability of Americans who
identify as “middle class”).
155. See infra Part II for more on these two competing conceptions of equity.
156. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 23–25; K N Energy, Inc. v. Fed. Energy
Reg. Comm’n, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[I]t has come to be well
established that . . . rates should be based on the costs of providing service to the
utility’s customers . . .”).
157. See David Spence, Naïve Energy Markets at 10–17 (Feb. 22, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (tracing conservative economic
thought making this case).
158. See Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Kronman and
Dworkin, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 248 (1980) (arguing for the “appeal of wealth
maximization as an alternative to utilitarianism”), see also Spence, supra note
157, at 20 (explaining economics’ break with utilitarian philosophy in the earlytwentieth century).
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section illustrates. However, adding access to ever-increasing
amounts of electricity has diminishing import in terms of life
sustenance—for example, if an electricity user has access to ten
times the basic amount necessary, adding that tenth unit
might allow the user to upgrade from a 3,000-square-foot to a
4,000-square-foot home. 159 This fact means that a legal regime
aiming not to maximize overall efficiency, but instead to
provide certain basic minima to all citizens, may actually
produce greater social welfare. 160 If this is the case, then clean
energy policy reforms that aim only to perfectly price costs and
benefits may fail to deliver welfare gains.
Moreover, even if cost causation is welfare maximizing as a
theoretical matter, there is another hurdle to this approach: it
does not reflect the balance struck, as a historical and political
matter, within electricity law. As the next section will show,
electricity law has never accepted perfect cost alignment as its
sole aim. Instead, lawmakers and the voters who elected them
have long been willing to sacrifice some efficiency for the sake
of ensuring wider access. 161
II. ENERGY LAW’S HISTORICAL EQUITY NORMS
There is a reason that arguments implicating the
inequities of clean energy policies resonate with energy
regulators: electricity law has a longstanding commitment to
incorporating and addressing equity concerns. I am not the
first to observe the centrality of distributional issues in
electricity law: scholars have long portrayed the field of public
utility law as a protracted ideological battle between “equity,”

159. This argument reflects the well-accepted economics concept of diminishing
marginal utility. See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A
Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 867 (2002).
160. This critique is not novel: the argument that “wealth is too narrow a
measure of human happiness” is “one of the most powerful critiques of the
economic analysis of law.” Id. at 849. But it is a critique that often gets lost within
the debates over energy market design. See Spence, supra note 157, at 20–22. I
take up the argument that efficiency, or wealth maximization, remains a
justifiable criterion for legal regime design, and that all redistribution should
occur through the tax code. See infra Part III.D.
161. Cf. Spence, supra note 157, at 17 (“While economics seeks allocative
efficiency, voters and their agents in Congress care not only about what is
efficient, but also what is just, or fair; and they sometimes favor collective
responses to risk.”).
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on the one hand, and “efficiency,” on the other. 162 In this view,
regulators are caught in a compromise game between two
camps of advocates. One side argues from the perspective of
fairness or equity that electricity, as a fundamental service,
should be priced based on need and ability to pay, such that
lower-income consumers should receive discounted rates.163
The other side defends the cost-causation principle introduced
above as a means to maximize social welfare, arguing that
perfectly apportioning costs to those who cause the system to
incur the costs will maximize social welfare. 164 These two
contradictory approaches both manifest themselves in various
facets of existing electricity law, causing scholars to long
bemoan the field’s inability to muster a coherent approach to
questions of equity. 165
In a time of rapidly shifting priorities within the field, it is
worth a fresh look at electricity law’s equity norms. In this
Part, I argue that framing electricity law as a protracted
contest between equity and efficiency obscures what has long
been electricity law’s underlying goal: a focus on access to
affordable electricity as a means of enabling broad
participation in markets and civil society. As this Part
illustrates, electricity law since its inception has focused on
widening the range of Americans able to take advantage of the
opportunities electricity provides, and has therefore
incorporated legal commitments to equity within a framework
that frequently emphasizes efficiency in order to do so.
Understanding energy’s equity commitment as rooted in this
goal of widespread access is critically important in regulators’
effort to retain important historical norms and precedents in
an era that requires radical shifts within the electricity sector.
The regulatory mandate has always been—and remains—
enabling access to affordable power; it is only the means that
must shift.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
These arguments harken to John Rawls’s concept of “primary goods.” Cf.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE xiii, 79 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing for a theory of
equality that maximizes the least advantaged group’s index of “primary goods,”
which are those things that “persons need . . . as normal and fully cooperating
members of society over a complete life”).
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
165. Trebing, supra note 21, at 31.
162.
163.
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A. The Creation of Public Utility Law
Before 1900, most Americans viewed electricity as a
spectacle: It lit the homes of the wealthy and formed “Great
White Ways” down the main streets of cities, but it was neither
commonplace nor necessary. 166 Fairly quickly, though,
Americans came to understand electricity’s practical
importance in easing the tasks of labor and daily home life.167
At the same time, the technical elite saw its potential as a tool
of social reform, capable of “dispers[ing] the ghettos of poverty,
the slums of misery and the Alsatias of vice.” 168
For these reasons, although electricity began as a
commodity produced and distributed by private companies, 169 a
public clamor began for government control over these
businesses. The question of whether utilities should be
privately owned or taken under municipal control became one
of the most prominent political debates of the early 1900s. 170
Theodore Roosevelt advocated for increasing government
supervision of the utility industry to ensure it was used “for
and not against the interest of the people as a whole.” 171 Many
in the industry and the academy also propounded the view that
these businesses were “natural monopolies” where competition
did not make sense, because duplicative sets of transmission
and distribution lines would be wasteful and inefficient. 172 But
166. See NYE, supra note 27, at 2, 29, 242.
167. Id. at 186, 250.
168. John Burns, Municipal Ownership a Blessing, in INDEPENDENT, Vol. 60 at
449 (1906) (advocating municipal ownership of electricity as a way to bring its
virtues into more homes); NYE, supra note 27, at 157.
169. RICHARD HIRSH, POWER LOSS 12–14 (1999); NYE, supra note 27, at 139.
170. See, e.g., Edward F. Dunne, Our Fight for Municipal Ownership,
INDEPENDENT Oct. 18, 1906, at 927 (“In recent years perhaps no subject has
engrossed so much of the attention of the public in the great cities of this
country . . . as the question of ownership and operation by the public of public
utilities.”); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGE 135–36, 148–49 (1998) (noting that municipalization was a
major issue in mayoral campaigns in New York City, Detroit, Chicago, San
Francisco, and Cleveland, among others).
171. DAVID NYE, CONSUMING POWER 127 (1999) (quoting address by
Roosevelt).
172. See PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 3–5; Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the
Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 10 (1940). But see Robert
L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, 43, 54,
in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY 43, 43 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H.
Cole eds., 2003) (arguing that at its inception, “government intervention into
electric markets was not the result of market failures but business and political
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natural monopoly status also created the possibility of
monopoly profits—an unacceptable proposition in the context of
a good so fundamental to American notions of progress. 173
Lawmakers navigated this tension by declaring electric
companies to be “public utilities,” which would be run by
private entities but regulated by state commissions. 174
Wisconsin and New York formed the first state public utility
commissions (PUCs) to oversee electric power in 1907, 175 and
by 1921 every state but Delaware had a commission. 176 The
framework established then persists largely intact today, at
least for those elements of the electric utility industry that
remain under commission control 177: commissions govern
utilities predominantly by “rate of return” regulation,
rewarding utilities a monopoly service area and a “fair return”
on their assets 178 in exchange for delivering power under a set
of conditions designed to protect the public. These conditions
include (1) an obligation to serve all those within a utility’s
service area who are willing and able to pay; 179 (2) a
requirement of safe and adequate service, (3) a prohibition on
“undue or unjust price discrimination,” and (4) a requirement
that rates be “just and reasonable.” 180
opportunism” and questioning whether the duplicative lines justification really
held weight).
173. NYE, supra note 27, at 141.
174. See WILLIAM E. MOSHER ET AL., ELECTRICAL UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN
PUBLIC CONTROL 4 (1929). For more detailed accounts of the rise of public utility
regulation, see Bradley, Jr., supra note 172; Boyd, supra note 14; William J.
Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State
Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050 (2002);
MOSHER, supra, ch. 1.
175. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 174, at 5.
176. NYE, supra note 27, at 181.
177. Since the 1990s, many states have required their electric utilities to sell
most or all of their generation assets. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell,
The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON.,
437, 445 (2015). Some states have also introduced retail competition, such that
only transmission and distribution utilities remain under commission oversight.
See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text.
178. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) (allowing regulated
companies to receive a “fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the
public convenience.”). The Supreme Court has since repudiated the “fair value”
standard, subsuming this question within the general inquiry of whether rates
are “just and reasonable.” See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
Am., 315 U.S. 575, 602 (1942).
179. This obligation is frequently referred to as the “duty to serve.” See Rossi,
supra note 21, at 1239.
180. See PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 118–19; Vol. 1, ALFRED E. KAHN, THE
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Several of these conditions demonstrate an early
commitment to access and affordability. The “just and
reasonable” rates mandate aimed, at least in theory, to keep
utility rates as low as possible for consumers. 181 Similarly, the
“obligation to serve” expanded access to all within a service
area, including those most expensive to reach. 182 And finally,
the prohibition on “unjust discrimination” prohibited utilities
from exploiting certain segments of the population by overcharging them as compared to their peers. 183
B. Widening Access: Public Power
Despite these protections, within a few decades the
limitations of public utility law became apparent. Early critics
railed against public utility law’s predominantly “negative”
character, which “prohibited certain obvious forms of
monopolistic behavior, but failed to impose definite
responsibility for socially desirable actions” and lacked any
“express mandate for the positive promotion of public
welfare.” 184 Such criticisms reflected the sense that lawmakers
had an obligation to do more than merely prohibit price
gouging for those already connected to the electric system. And
this sentiment sprang from a stark reality facing the country
by 1930 with respect to electricity: whereas urban dwellers

ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, at 3 (1988)
(identifying the same four principal components of public utility regulation); Boyd,
supra note 14, at 1641.
181. See, e.g., P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. Telecom. Reg. Bd. of P.R., 665 F.3d 309, 316
(1st Cir. 2011) (“Regulation of retail prices focused on setting ‘just and reasonable
rates,’ balancing the utility provider’s interest in a fair return on investment
against the public’s interest in a fair price for services.”).
182. See N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917) (Public
service corporations “may not pick and choose, serving only the portions of the
territory covered by their franchises which it is presently profitable for them to
serve . . . .”); PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 119.
183. See Robert Hale, Commissions, Rates, & Policies, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1103,
1105 (1940) (defining “unjust discrimination” as resulting “from unequal rates for
services whose rates ought to be equal, or from equal rates for services whose
rates ought to be different”).
184. Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND &
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 16 (1940). See also KAHN, supra note 180, at 18 (“[T]he role of
the government remains essentially negative—setting maximum prices . . .
specifying minimum standards of service”); MOSHER ET AL., supra note 174, at xix
(cataloguing “the extent to which the industry is still being administered as any
other exploitative private industry”).
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considered electricity a commonplace necessity, 185 90 percent of
farms still lacked access. 186
The notable gap in electricity service left by public utility
regulation caused consternation among a wide group of
progressive thinkers and rural Americans. 187 Many declared
electrical service “a right”; 188 Franklin D. Roosevelt called it “a
definite necessity” and considered its profusion a key
component of New Deal social and economic reforms. 189
Electrification beyond the city required a strategy beyond
public utility law. Under no legal compulsion to operate outside
their service territories, utilities not only refused to extend
service into unprofitable regions but also fought farmers’
efforts to form their own local electric cooperatives.190
Ultimately this strategy backfired, as increasing frustration
with utilities’ monopolistic behavior combined with the
hardships of the Great Depression to turn public opinion in
favor of large-scale public power projects during the 1930s. 191
Consequently, Congress passed legislation creating the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933 and the Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) in 1936, 192 which together
185. NYE, supra note 171, at 171.
186. NYE, supra note 27, at 287; MOSHER ET AL., supra note 174, at xiv
(comparing U.S. progress on rural electrification unfavorably to Germany,
Sweden, Denmark, and Ontario).
187. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 27, at 304; SARAH T. PHILLIPS, THIS LAND, THIS
NATION 21–26, 35 (2007) (documenting how electrification functioned as part of a
larger effort to relieve rural poverty and promote efficient resource use); Jean
Christie, Giant Power: A Progressive Proposal of the Nineteen-Twenties, 96 PENN.
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 480, 485 (1972) (finding that one of the “leading
theme[s] of the arguments for government diffusion of electric power” was
“concern for rural life”).
188. NYE, supra note 27, at 301 (discussing the address of L.J. Taber to a
1920s National Electric Lighting Association convention on rural electrification);
ROY TALBERT, JR., FDR’S UTOPIAN: ARTHUR MORGAN OF THE TVA 147 (1987)
(describing TVA head David Lilienthal’s “vigorous campaign on behalf of
electricity as a natural right for all Americans”).
189. NYE, supra note 27, at 304; TALBERT, supra note 188, at 118, 128; see also
Christie, supra note 187, at 494–95 (discussing Gifford Pinchot’s call for greater
government intervention to ensure that electric power would “be made
incomparably the greatest material blessing in human history”).
190. NYE, supra note 27, at 292, 308; Bruce Wyman, The Obligations of Public
Services to Make Connections, 22 HARV. L. REV. 564, 571 (1909).
191. NYE, supra note 27, at 304.
192. See Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (1933)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2012)) [hereinafter TVA Act]. The REA
was first created by Executive Order in 1935, and later statutorily authorized and
expanded. See Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935) (adopted under the authority
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brought electricity to most farms throughout the country.
These statutes’ central focus was on empowering rural
Americans to build their own electricity networks. 193 The TVA
Act did so by prioritizing public purchasers in selling the
electricity generated by its dams, thereby providing a reliable
source of cheap power for consumers not served by utilities.194
The Act also gave the TVA’s governing board authority to
extend loans to help municipalities and electric cooperatives
construct and operate the transmission and distribution lines
necessary to access TVA power. 195
Similarly, the REA operated primarily through the
assurance of loans provided at the government rate of
interest. 196 Rural electric cooperatives, organized and
democratically controlled by participating residents, received
the vast majority of these loans. 197 These cooperatives proved
exceedingly successful in marshaling the resources necessary
to electrify rural America: within twenty years, they had wired
ninety percent of their service territories. 198 The cooperative
structure also served participatory functions: thousands of
farmers and their families would gather to discuss their
of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, ch. 48, 49 Stat. 115 (1935));
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363 (May 20, 1936) (codified at
7 U.S.C. § 901) [hereinafter REA Act]. Many states also undertook rural
electrification efforts around this time. See RURAL ELEC. ADMIN, ELECTRIC POWER
ON THE FARM 143 (David Cushman Cole ed., 1936) (noting state authorities in
North and South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee and other programs in
Wisconsin and Minnesota) [hereinafter ON THE FARM].
193. Cf. PHILLIPS, supra note 187, at 35 (arguing that electrification was
driven by the question of how to distribute the wealth of industrialism and
modernity more equitably).
194. See TVA Act Preamble, § 11; see also Joseph P. Mentor, Jr., The Preference
Clause Revisited: Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District v. Johnson and the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 413, 416–17 (1983).
195. TVA Act §§ 12–12a.
196. See REA Act §§ 2–4; U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND TELEPHONE PROGRAMS 1 (1983).
197. See Jim Cooper, Electric Co-operatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 346, 346 n.77 (2008); ON THE FARM, supra note 192, at
136, 157 (noting that loans were typically not made for less than $40,000 for
approximately forty miles of line, the smallest project considered financially
feasible, which caused rural residents to have to canvass and campaign for
cooperative participants); see also THE NEXT GREATEST THING, supra note 28, at
81–87 (describing co-ops’ formation process).
198. Cooper, supra note 197, at 347 (“No private companies had ever stretched
copper wire faster, over longer distances, or been a conduit of more federal
subsidy dollars.”).
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cooperative’s finances and operations during day-long
sessions. 199 These meetings had “a spiritual meaning to people
who were so long denied the benefits of modern energy.” 200
Both the TVA and the REA relied on private sector support
to create economically sustainable models that could broaden
access. In conjunction with national appliance manufacturers,
the agencies designed and promoted more affordable versions
of popular electronic appliances for rural residents, marketed
under the logo “Electricity for All.” 201 The agencies also
extended loans directly to farms to assist in the wiring of
houses and outbuildings and the purchase of electrical
equipment. 202 These sales increased electricity demand,
allowing cooperatives to pay for their newly constructed
transmission lines while keeping prices low. 203
For rural residents, electricity proved transformational on
a physical and more profound level. In addition to easing the
enormous burdens of hauling wood and water, electricity
brought connections to the world beyond the farm, powering
radios and eliminating the challenge of reading by kerosene
lamp. 204 One widely printed poem called rural electrification
“democracy at work,” proclaiming: “out of the darkness, light,
out of despair / the new fulfillment of equality.” 205
As a legal matter, the public power mandates of the 1930s
reflected a societal refusal to allow the boundaries of energy
access to be determined by the economics of public utility
companies or the reach of public utility law. These programs
treated electricity as an important foundational good,
necessary for participation in the nation’s economy and in its
democratic traditions. But it is important not to overstate their
199. See DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 19–20 (1944).
200. Id. at 20.
201. See TALBERT, supra note 188, at 145–48; NYE, supra note 27, at 318; ON
THE FARM, supra note 192, at 159. The Electric Home and Farm Authority
(EHFA), created by the TVA, supplied these loans to families. See Exec. Order No.
6514 (Dec. 19, 1933).
202. See REA Act § 5; ON THE FARM, supra note 192, at 158.
203. Field, supra note 29, at 33; see also LILIENTHAL, supra note 199, at 22
(explaining the TVA’s strategy in this regard); THE NEXT GREATEST THING, supra
note 28, at 61 (explaining Morris Cooke’s argument that the key to rural
electrification’s success was to create large average use of current, in order to keep
rates low enough “to effect the coveted social advantages”).
204. See CARO, supra note 27; THE NEXT GREATEST THING, supra note 28.
205. NYE, supra note 27, at 325–26 (discussing a poem on rural electrification
written by Walter Paschall).
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idealism: While those behind the public power movement often
spoke of electricity as a right, the Acts themselves only went so
far as to enable more Americans to organize themselves into
groups able to access reasonably priced electricity. 206 And the
Acts did not reach all Americans: those rural areas that could
not, for economic or other reasons, organize themselves into
viable cooperatives continued to be left out of electrification’s
gains. 207 Public power thus widened affordable electricity
access, but did not disrupt its status as a commodity for sale
only to those who could afford to pay something for it.
C. Creating a Floor or Creating Rationality? The Debates
of the 1970s
The model of public utility commissions combined with
rural electric cooperatives proved adequate to address equity
concerns within energy law for many decades. 208 But in the
1970s, electricity rates finally began to rise, 209 putting pressure
on electricity law to consider equity in new ways. 210 Longdormant questions over cost distribution among consumers
came to the fore, discussed in conversations over “rate
design.” 211
206. See supra notes 192–203 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., CARO, supra note 27, at 502–03 (describing why electricity took
decades longer to come to remote Texas Hill Country); see also Alysa Landry, Not
Alone in the Dark: Navaho Nation’s Lack of Electricity Problem, INDIAN COUNTRY
MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 11, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2015/02/11/not-alone-dark-navajo-nations-lack-electricity-problem-159135
[https://perma.cc/L89S-Z86M] (documenting ongoing challenges in connecting
thousands of Navajo Nation residents to the electric grid).
208. See Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly System, in
THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY 89, 101 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole
eds., 2003) (“[T]he natural monopoly system outweighed the costs in the period
between 1945 and 1965 for the following reasons: predictability, the direction of
electricity prices, path dependence, and transition costs.”); see also Paul Joskow,
Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public
Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. L. & ECON. 291, 312 (1974).
209. Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income
Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 640 (1990)
(“Nationally, electric rates rose ninety percent in the five years after 1970.”).
210. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 12; Joskow, supra note 208, at 312–13
(arguing that a confluence of factors “wreaked havoc” on ratemaking, including
inflation, rising interest rates, increased environmental concern, and energy
shortages).
211. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 19–20. Concurrently, the number of utility
rate cases soared and the public began to intervene in commission proceedings in
much greater numbers. See Krieger, supra note 209, at 640; Joskow, supra note
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An influential 1971 article by Richard Posner highlighted
the prevalence of “internal subsidies” in regulated industries as
a form of “taxation by regulation.” 212 Posner’s article illustrated
the ways in which regulation performed “distributive and
allocative chores,” particularly through uniform rates charged
to consumers with different costs of service. 213 Attention to
internal
subsidies
caused
some
economists
and
conservationists to unite in pressing for regulated prices to
better reflect the costs of providing energy at the particular
time and place it was demanded. 214 Such changes would reduce
electricity demand, particularly at peak periods, thus
improving the environment and increasing economic welfare.215
But these goals collided with the objective of helping
consumers to manage their skyrocketing energy bills,
especially as it became clear that rising rates did not equally
harm all consumers. Rising energy prices caused low-income
households to devote eleven to fourteen percent of their income
to home energy costs, as compared to an average of three
percent. 216 This disparity either caused lower-income
households to lose service or crowded out their ability to
purchase other basic goods. 217 Advocates on behalf of energy as
a basic good or necessity therefore pressed for reduced prices
for those struggling to pay their electricity bills. 218
These debates crystallized the “fairness versus efficiency”
contest in public utility law (and well beyond), which pitted the
208, at 299; William T. Gormley, Jr., Public Advocacy in Public Utility
Commission Proceedings, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 446, 446 (1981).
212. Posner, supra note 21, at 22. Posner argued that “internal subsidies”
resulted from the fact that services like electricity were priced equally for all
consumers within particular classes, despite the fact that individual households
and businesses actually cost different amounts to serve, such that some customers
were non-transparently subsidizing others. Id.
213. Id. at 23.
214. See Joskow, supra note 208, at 314, 317; PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 20;
see also Kahn, supra note 180, at xxviii (tracing commissions’ rising interest in
“economic efficiency” to discourage inefficient consumption and reduce capacity
expansion); Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public
Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966, 966 (1975) (defining policy makers’ equity
concerns as centering on the question of whether a proposed price structure
“unduly” favors certain consumers by resulting in a cross-subsidy).
215. Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 381.
216. Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 470.
217. Id.; Diana Hernández & Stephen Bird, Energy Burden and the Need for
Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy, 2 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 5,
11–13 (2010).
218. Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 472–73.
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two visions of the purpose of energy law against each other: one
focused on rationalizing rates so everyone paid her own way,
and the other focused on differential treatment based on ability
to pay. 219 At its heart, this debate concerned the legal question
of when discrimination among consumers is “due” or “just”: for
one group, it was just when discrimination remedied efficiency
failures; for another group, it was just when it helped maintain
affordable electricity for all. More broadly, this debate called
into question the role of regulatory commissions: were they to
act as a substitute for competition, trying to produce the
outcomes that a theoretical market would, but for the existence
of a natural monopoly? 220 Or were they to play a more
capacious role in the provisioning of basic services that society
refused to leave to the market? 221
Neither side of this debate fully triumphed. The major
federal energy statute passed at the time, the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 222 reflects
lawmakers’ refusal to choose between fairness and efficiency.
The Act required state commissions to eliminate crosssubsidization among classes of electric consumers and to
consider adopting time-of-use rates that varied by time of day
and season. 223 But PURPA tempered its push towards
economic rationality by requiring states to consider the
adoption of “lifeline rates,” which would give elderly and lowincome consumers a certain quantity of basic service below
cost. 224
219. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 20; ZAJAC, supra note 20, at 2–3 (explaining
that public utility pricing represents “100 years” of “deal[ing] in practical terms
with the tradeoff” between equity and efficiency); Trebing, supra note 21, at 17;
BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 121–34.
220. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 173 (“[R]egulation is a substitute for
competition and should attempt to put the utility sector under the same restraints
competition places on the industrial sector.”); BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 109
(“Regulation can . . . be regarded as a substitute for competition—probably as an
inferior substitute.”).
221. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 1651–58 (explaining how understandings of
the role of regulatory commissions evolved during this period).
222. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–617, 92 Stat.
3117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)).
223. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-543, at 10 (1978), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7673, 7679 (explaining that the bill aims to move
utilities towards pricing electricity “at true cost” to encourage conservation).
224. 16 U.S.C. § 2624; PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 449; see also Lester W.
Baxter, Electricity Policies for Low-Income Households, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 247, 248
(1998). PURPA also established recommended standards that prohibited
terminating electric service for non-payment during periods “especially dangerous
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State regulators followed PURPA’s lead in mixing
efficiency and fairness reforms. Many commissions adopted
“inverted block rate” pricing, which punished large consumers
by charging more for consumption above certain levels.225
These rates responded to conservationists’ concerns that
energy scarcity should be reflected in rates, 226 but also
implicitly protected low-income consumers by charging the
lowest price for power adequate to cover basic needs. 227 Lifeline
rates proved more controversial: While some states, including
California and New York, adopted such rates, they remained
difficult to implement within the confines of public utility
law. 228 It was hard to determine who deserved a lifeline, and
onto whom the costs of lifeline rate provision should be
shifted. 229 For this reason, many commissions rejected lifeline
rates as falling outside the purview of what public utility law
was set up to do. 230
Separately from these public utility debates and spurred
by skyrocketing energy bills, in 1981 Congress adopted a
federally-funded program designed to mitigate energy
inequality called the “Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program” (LIHEAP). 231 LIHEAP, which is still in existence
today, uses block grants to states to assist low-income
households in meeting their home energy costs, although
to health.” See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2623, 2625(g) (2012).
225. KAHN, supra note 180, at xxx–xxxi.
226. Id. at xxxi. Some commissions also began to move towards time-of-use
tariffs for large industrial and commercial customers, who had the metering
infrastructure necessary to utilize these more complex tariff structures. See
Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 382.
227. KAHN, supra note 180, at xxx–xxxi.
228. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 449–51; Krieger, supra note 209, at 663–65
(describing contentious implementation of lifeline rates in California, where “most
of the [commission] staff objected to the concept” but consumer groups succeeded
in building a coalition “involving senior citizen groups, labor unions, and
environmental organizations”).
229. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 450 (explaining the challenges of including
industrial ratepayers in paying for lifeline rates, given the countervailing
argument that including this class might increase the price of other basic goods,
also harming low-income consumers).
230. See, e.g., Rate Concessions to Poor Persons & Senior Citizens, 14
P.U.R.4th 87, 90 (Or. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 16, 1976) (finding no authority for
commissioner to “discriminate between customers on the basis of income levels,”
and collecting decisions from other states reaching the same conclusion); see also
Trebing, supra note 21, at 33 (explaining that commissions were reluctant to
adopt redistributive rate structures).
231. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97–35, 95 Stat. 357
(Aug. 13, 1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621–8630 (2012)).
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funding has never been near sufficient to cover demand.232
Contemporaneously with LIHEAP, federal and state
governments also began to direct funding towards low-income
“weatherization” efforts, which provide home energy audits,
storm windows, insulation, and other technologies to lowincome households. 233 Weatherization programs have proven
an enduring alternative to direct rate subsidization, as they
permanently reduce energy costs in low-income households,234
which often prove among the least efficient energy users. 235 In
this way, such policies might prove important models for
policies that attempt to spread additional clean energy
technologies more equally.
D. Restructuring & Low-Income Consumers
Widening Americans’ access to affordable power began as a
Progressive and New Deal era project, consonant with the
ideologies of those times. But by the end of the twentieth
century and in a very different political climate, regulators
232. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621–8622 (defining “home energy” as residential
heating and cooling). Each state establishes its own LIHEAP program guidelines
and distributes its funds through local agencies. The maximum income eligibility
is the greater of 150 percent of the federal poverty level or 60 percent of the state
median income. See 42 U.S.C. § 8624 (2012). A 1995 study found that only 20
percent of the 30 million eligible households received any LIHEAP assistance.
Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 469. For a more detailed discussion of
LIHEAP, see LIBBY PERL, CONG. RES. SERV., LIHEAP: PROGRAM AND FUNDING 7
(2013); Behles, supra note 13, at 27–31.
233. See Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 472. States can use up to
fifteen percent of their LIHEAP grants towards weatherization efforts, and the
U.S. Department of Energy also runs its own Weatherization Assistance Program
(WAP) targeted at low-income households. See The Energy Conservation in
Existing Buildings Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–385, title IV, 90 Stat. 1150 (1976)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6851 et seq.).
234. See Baxter, supra note 224, at 249; see also Scott, supra note 135, at 389
(suggesting that commissions adopted energy efficiency policies primarily to lower
rates). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $5 billion
to the WAP. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOW INCOME HOME
ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 39–
40 (2011).
235. A 2016 study found that low-income households pay on average $1.41 in
energy costs per square foot, whereas the average non-low-income household pays
only $1.17 per square foot, indicating that low-income households “reside in less
efficient housing.” See ARIEL DREHOBL & LAUREN ROSS, LIFTING THE HIGH
ENERGY
BURDEN
IN
AMERICA’S
LARGEST
CITIES
(2016),
http://energyefficiencyforall.org/sites/default/files/Lifting%20the%20High%20Ener
gy%20Burden_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2JX-W2DH].
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across the country viewed it as central to their mission. They
demonstrated this enduring commitment during industry
upheavals in the 1990s, when “retail restructuring” changed
the basic model of electricity provisioning in many states. 236
Retail restructuring followed a series of reforms in federal
law that increased competition in electricity markets.237
Buoyed by this enhanced competition in wholesale electricity
markets, many states decided to allow competition among
retail electricity suppliers as well. 238 Under retail
restructuring, consumers would be able to choose their
electricity supplier from a competitive pool, with only
distribution service remaining a traditionally regulated
monopoly. 239 Competition created through this model would, in
theory, lower energy prices by allowing consumers to shop for
the best deal. 240
One of the greatest obstacles to retail restructuring quickly
proved to be the question of how to ensure continued affordable
universal service within a competitive marketplace, where
retail suppliers could screen out those customers considered
risky or high-cost. 241 In some places, these concerns caused
regulators to abandon altogether plans to open electricity
provisioning to competition. 242 In those states where retail
236. See Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity
Markets in the United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND
CHALLENGES 5–10 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005).
237. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 2776, §§
721–22 (1992) (relevant portions codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(j)–(k) (2012)); FERC
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 385 (1996); see also generally
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765 (2008) (describing the restructuring process and exploring its purpose,
promise, and limits).
238. By 1998 more than half of states had opened proceedings to consider retail
restructuring. See BARBARA ALEXANDER, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS FOR
RETAIL ELECTRIC COMPETITION: MODEL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 2 (1996).
239. Rossi, supra note 21, at 1294 (observing that states created “de jure
monopol[ies] for distribution, subject to fairly traditional regulation”).
240. See ALEXANDER, supra note 238, at 3; Rossi, supra note 21, at 1281 (“It is
well-recognized that, in order to maximize the benefits of competition in wholesale
power markets, retail access to competition for all customers will be necessary.”).
241. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 1288, 1299–1300 (suggesting that defining the
“scope of extraordinary service obligations and their financing” was critical to the
success of retail competition).
242. Id. at 1290. Regulators also worried about losing other consumer
protections, including protections regarding credit terms, contract terms, late fees,
security deposits, and disconnection and connection practices. See ALEXANDER,
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restructuring proceeded, the challenge of assuring continued
affordable service for all consumers assumed a central position
on regulatory dockets. 243
Thus, even two decades into a deregulatory revolution in
the United States, 244 no state proved willing to leave electricity
to the market. 245 Instead, each state pursuing restructuring
adopted some variant of “provider of last resort” service, which
created an obligation to serve those who otherwise could not
obtain service. 246 Restructuring legislation also typically
included some means of continued funding for low-income
assistance programs, typically by assessing a “system benefits
charge” on all distribution customers. 247
Retail restructuring has had a rocky rollout and
reception. 248 Its successes and failures remain a topic of some
debate, and one that will not be explored in depth here. 249 For
supra note 238, at 4.
243. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 1292–94 (collecting states’ views on the
importance of maintaining protections for low-income consumers during
restructuring).
244. See Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 165–68 (2001) (situating electricity deregulation
and restructuring within broader deregulatory trends in telecommunications,
airlines, railroads, and natural gas); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, 98
COLUM L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998) (describing the paradigm shift in regulated
industries law).
245. Cf. Rossi, supra note 21, at 1291 (“Without a duty to serve, the electricity
market might operate much like other deregulated markets, such as trucking and
banking, which rely on contractual obligations and general consumer protection
laws to ensure service delivery.”).
246. This obligation attaches either to the incumbent distribution utility or
certain retail suppliers. Compare 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2807(e)(3) (2015)
(distribution company), with Electricity Options: Provider of Last Resort, TEX.
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.puc.texas.gov/consumer/electricity/polr.aspx
(last visited June 22, 2015) [https://perma.cc/G3CW-LBXF] (selected retail
supplier within each region). See also Rossi, supra note 21, at 1311–12.
247. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 1241. System benefits charges also cover other
“public benefits,” including energy efficiency and demand-side-management
programs. See ALEXANDER, supra note 238, at 4; Scott, supra note 135, at 388.
248. California’s infamous challenges with its restructuring design, which
created widespread power outages and left the market ripe for manipulation,
caused many states to reconsider restructuring. Of the twenty-four states that
instigated electricity restructuring, seven have suspended it. See Timothy P.
Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 471, 471 (2002); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Status of Electricity
Restructuring by State (Sept. 2010) http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/
restructuring/restructure_elect.html [https://perma.cc/UD7P-VEF8].
249. See generally Spence, supra note 237; Peter Navarro & Michael Shames,
Electricity Deregulation: Lessons Learned from California, 24 ENERGY L.J. 33
(2003).

9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

624

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/10/2017 7:27 PM

[Vol. 88

present purposes, it is important merely to note that even in
the midst of a profound legal shift in how regulators conceived
of the relationship between consumers and electricity supply,
affordable access remained a core consideration. Electricity
remained too foundational to human flourishing to be left to
the whims of the market, available only to those who could
negotiate to obtain it.
E. Summing the Parts
It is certainly true, as many scholars have suggested, that
electricity law provides no ready formula for balancing fairness
and efficiency. 250 But the laws and policies adopted during the
twentieth century project of electrification demonstrate an
enduring commitment to the goal of enabling widespread
access to affordable electricity. This goal was furthered at
certain points by a focus on efficiency—as in the case of rate
design reforms in the 1970s—and at other points by a focus on
fairness—as in the case of providing discounted power to assist
rural electrification efforts and, later, keeping all consumers
connected to the grid during times of energy price spikes. 251
One reason that electricity law has not settled for an
exclusive focus on low rates is that these have never been an
end in themselves, just as electricity has never been a “good” in
and of itself. 252 The justification for governmental control over
electricity has been its ability to lift Americans out of drudgery
and into a life where engagement with society—on terms of the
individual’s choosing—is possible. In their focus on access and
affordability, our electricity laws reflect a marriage between
concepts of electricity as a necessity for full participation in
American life and as a utilitarian tool to help “grow the
American pie” by inducing widespread consumerism. 253 While
250. See Trebing, supra note 21, at 31 (noting a “tendency toward averaging
conflicting claims”); Posner, supra note 21, at 44 (finding “no objective basis for
balancing off distributive benefits against allocative costs”).
251. Cf. Spence, supra note 157, at 39 (observing that “[s]ince its inception
more than a century ago, modern American energy law – public utility law and
environmental law – has sought to reconcile . . . conflicting impulses [towards
efficiency and fairness]”).
252. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
253. Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 103 (1994) (“How to make
the pie larger, not how to divide the existing pie, is the crux of the long-range and
primarily significant problem.”); LILIENTHAL, supra note 199, at 75–76 (describing
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only in extreme cases have we been willing to provide an
energy “handout,” 254 lawmakers have eagerly used law to
expand the number of people capable of enjoying the lifetransforming qualities of electricity, and have been tolerant of
some pricing inefficiencies that appear to support this aim.
III. FROM GRID ACCESS TO THE PARTICIPATORY GRID
Electricity law’s historical embrace of “widespread access
to cheap power” as a means of ensuring equity presents a
challenging precedent for the current era. This animating goal
worked when consuming more power was presumed to lead
inexorably to a stronger economy and a stronger democracy.255
But it is no longer tenable in the era of climate change, whose
global, intergenerational, and domestic inequities suggest the
need for more complex understandings of energy equity.
The equity debates over clean energy highlighted in Part I
have proceeded largely along traditional fault lines within
public utility law: the project of adopting reforms to induce
more efficient, effective participation in the grid 256 is counterbalanced by the risks such reforms might pose to low-income
consumers. The reality is far more complex, given widespread
agreement that climate change will harm the poor more than
the wealthy. 257 In light of this fact, there appears a certain
absurdity in halting clean energy policies—policies designed to
stem the tide of climate change—in the name of equity.
This Part begins by parsing the complex equity questions
that electricity regulators confront as they consider using clean
energy policies to address climate change. Section A shows that
the importance of electrification in providing a sense of empowerment and
participation).
254. Sovacool and Dworkin explain that many states are quite limited in their
exceptions to shutoffs: They give the example of Vermont, where residential
customers can only avoid shutoff outside of the coldest winter months by
furnishing a physician’s certificate asserting the resident would suffer “an
immediate and serious health hazard by the disconnection.” SOVACOOL &
DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 223.
255. See supra note 32.
256. “Efficient” in the sense that the participatory grid is a cost-effective way to
induce the kinds of changes in electricity consumption that climate change
demands. Cf. DOUGLAS & ZAFAR, supra note 53, at 3 (“Customer participation,
more than the actions of the utilities or of the regulators, is critical to meet
California’s greenhouse gas emission goals in a cost-effective manner.”).
257. See infra notes 259, 262–268.
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there is good reason to believe that halting or slowing clean
energy also will seriously harm low-income consumers within
the United States, making “equity” a poor justification for
impeding clean energy policies. Section B then argues that if
electricity regulators choose to pursue grid participation as a
way to mitigate the impacts of climate change, then their longstanding regulatory duty to ensure widespread access requires
a widening of the range of people able to participate in the grid.
Section C defends this conclusion as not only in line with a
century-old effort to maintain or enhance the affordability of
electricity, but also as part of the long tradition of using
electricity to empower Americans to become active members of
the economy and polity.
A. Climate and Energy Laws’ Distinct but Overlapping
Equities
Domestic
regulators—such
as
public
utilities
commissions—have a difficult task in figuring out how to
balance the overlapping concerns of climate justice and clean
energy justice. 258 The geographical and temporal dimensions of
climate change equity make it hard to square with domestic
regulatory frameworks. The poor within developing countries,
particularly those in Africa and Southeast Asia, will be most
negatively impacted by climate change. 259 And although we are
already experiencing the negative effects of climate change,
climate disruptions anticipated in the future dwarf the effects
of today, such that the future poor stand to benefit more than
the present poor from policies designed to mitigate climate

258. See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 101,
144 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1591–96 (2011).
259. These disparate impacts stem from geographical disparities in climate
change’s impacts, as well as settlement and livelihood patterns. See Christopher
B. Field et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 6–9 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC
WORKING GROUP II]; Tim Hayward, Climate Change and Ethics, in 2 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 843, 843 (Dec. 2012); Steve Vanderheiden, Climate Change,
Fairness, & Equity, in ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 2 (2008); ENCYCLICAL LETTER LAUDATO SI’ OF THE HOLY FATHER
FRANCIS, ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME 21–22 (2015).
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change. 260
The inter-temporal and international dimensions of
climate change have long made domestic progress on climate
change mitigation challenging. That said, these far-reaching
equity debates do not comprise the central challenge in clean
energy justice. In the debates over clean energy’s equities,
regulators are concerned primarily with the disparate impacts
that clean energy policies present for the present poor as
compared to the present rich—or, in other words, with more
traditional questions of access within electricity law. 261 These
equity concerns, once properly contextualized, are far less
intractable than the intergenerational and international equity
challenges that plague climate negotiations.
Moreover, there are compelling equity-based reasons for
energy regulators—even operating within their mandated focus
on near-term equity concerns within the United States—to
value moving clean energy policies forward. Although it is less
frequently observed, climate change will also produce disparate
impacts within the United States.
Experts broadly agree that climate change will harm the
poor within the United States more than the affluent along
three dimensions, although assessing the magnitude of these
disparities remains challenging. 262 First, poor and minority
260. See, e.g., POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 258, at 144. Indeed, the poor of
today cannot benefit in the short term from carbon mitigation as such, because we
have already emitted enough carbon to “lock in” warming effects for some time
into the future. STERN, supra note 23, at 156 (“Only a small portion of the cost of
climate change between now and 2050 can be realistically avoided, because of
inertia in the climate system.”); Lisa V. Alexander et al., Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 27 (2013) (“Most aspects of
climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO2 are
stopped.”) [hereinafter IPCC WORKING GROUP I].
261. See generally supra Part I (explaining the ways in which regulators’
concerns over the disparate burdens of clean energy policies are impeding their
advancement).
262. See, e.g., IPCC WORKING GROUP II, supra note 259, at 12 (“Risks are
unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and
communities in countries at all levels of development.”); U.S. National Climate
Assessment, Highlights: Climate Change Effects in the U.S., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
RES. PROGRAM, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report (last visited Nov. 22, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/NQH7-NVEF] (“Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to
the range of climate change related health impacts, including the elderly,
children, the poor, and the sick.”); ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & KAREN AKERLOF,
RACE, ETHNICITY AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010); STERN,
supra note 23, at 5(10) (“Low-income households will be disproportionately
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communities are likely to be disproportionately impacted by
climate change-related disasters, including heat waves and
storms, 263 due to factors including lack of air conditioning,
greater prevalence of pre-existing health conditions, location
and condition of housing, inadequate access to transportation,
relatively greater rates of under-insurance, and concentration
in strenuous occupations. 264 Indeed, Hurricanes Sandy and
Katrina already brought to the public’s attention the ways in
which domestic disasters—which are likely increasing in
severity and frequency due to climate change—cause disparate
impacts according to class. 265
Second, climate change will increase the price of basic
necessities, including water, energy, and food, 266 causing loweraffected by increases in extreme weather events. Those on lower incomes often
live in higher-risk areas, marginal lands and poor quality housing.”). It is
notoriously challenging to predictively model how particular changes in
greenhouse gas concentrations will cause earth systems to respond, and how these
changes will in turn impact global, regional, and local economies. For these
reasons, economists have not yet been able to offer much quantitative insight into
the differential impacts that climate change will have on low-income populations
within countries. See STERN, supra note 23, at 143; IPCC WORKING GROUP I,
supra note 260, at 13–14; IPCC WORKING GROUP II, supra note 259, at 20 (noting
difficulty of estimating economic impacts from climate change); Masur & Posner,
supra note 258, at 1560 (describing our climate-society models as “extraordinarily
crude”).
263. See RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., THE CLIMATE GAP: INEQUALITIES
IN HOW CLIMATE CHANGE HURTS AMERICANS & HOW TO CLOSE THE GAP 7–12
(2009).
264. See SETH B. SHONKOFF ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND EQUITY
IMPACTS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE AND MITIGATION POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 16–17 (2009) (reviewing a wide body of scientific
literature reaching these conclusions particularly as they relate to California);
CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND., INC., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
AN UNEQUAL BURDEN 3 (2004), http://rprogress.org/publications/2004/CBCF_
REPORT_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QGS-9TQT].
265. See generally Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, Note, No New Orleanians
Left Behind: An Examination of the Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina, 38
CONN. L. REV. 1153 (2006); Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev., Toward an Informed
Rebuilding: Documenting Sandy’s Impacts, http://www.prattcenter.net/research/
toward-informed-rebuilding-documenting-sandys-impacts [https://perma.cc/C4QFHCQT] (collecting maps showing the disparate impact of Hurricane Sandy on lowincome New Yorkers).
266. MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., supra note 263 at 15. A Natural Resource
Defense Council study found that under a business-as-usual scenario, climate
change will cause energy costs to rise $28 billion by 2025 and $141 billion by
2100, and water sector costs to rise $200 billion by 2025 and $950 billion by 2100.
FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, THE COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
WHAT WE’LL PAY IF GLOBAL WARMING CONTINUES UNCHECKED v (2008);
SHONKOF ET AL., supra note 264, at 9–10.

9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION

4/10/2017 7:27 PM

629

income households to face difficult budgetary tradeoffs between
feeding their families and paying their utility bills. 267 And
third, the poor will experience the greatest disruptions in
employment opportunities, as they are disproportionately
employed in agriculture and tourism, the two economic sectors
most impacted by climate change. 268
These inequitable burdens should at least raise serious
questions about a strategy of halting clean energy policies on
grounds of equity. To be sure, these impacts will harm future
U.S. low-income households more than present-day ones.269
But given the rapid scale of changes, “today’s poor” are also, to
a large extent, the poor of a climate-changed tomorrow.270
Thus, when the poor of today pay something towards
addressing climate change, they themselves and especially
their children and grandchildren stand to gain in the future.
This fact appears to be well understood and valued by many of
“today’s poor” in the United States. Surveys consistently show
greater support among minority communities for action on
climate change—even if it will prove costly—than among the
American public more generally. 271 These preferences deserve
267. See David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: CarbonEmissions Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093,
1108 (2010) (“When energy prices rose 42.1% from 2000 to 2005, families with
annual incomes between $15,000 and $30,000 reduced their food spending by
10%.”); Hernández & Bird, supra note 217, at 6 (“With energy costs increasingly
on the rise, low-income families are often left to make hard choices about whether
to spend their money on food or energy.”); see generally Jayanta Bhattacharya et
al., Heat or Eat? Cold-Weather Shocks and Nutrition in Poor American Families,
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1149 (2003).
268. MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., supra note 263, at 15–16.
269. Cf. POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 258, at 26–27 (arguing that
“[r]educing carbon emissions is not a way to help today’s poor”).
270. See Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
1215, 1215, 1234–35 (2014) (observing that “time flow creates systematic linedrawing challenges for decision makers who must distinguish between present
and future events,” as there is in fact no moment at which the “next generation”
arrives).
271. See Coral Davenport, Climate Is Big Issue for Hispanics, and Personal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
10,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
02/10/us/politics/climate-change-is-of-growing-personal-concern-to-us-hispanicspoll-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XY7E-Y3ZB] (describing results of a recent
survey finding that Hispanics “are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to view
global warming as a problem that affects them personally” and “are more likely to
support policies, such as taxes and regulations on greenhouse gas pollution, aimed
at curbing it”); Harry Enten, The Racial Gap on Global Warming,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 23, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/the-racialgap-on-global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/S63W-DRUV] (reporting that non-white
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to be taken seriously.
Moreover, the inter-temporal equity challenges of climate
mitigation policies can be reduced if policies are designed to
serve multiple ends, such that they contemporaneously work to
cut carbon and reduce inequality. 272 Of course, experts
frequently make this suggestion; it forms much of the basis of
the popular concept of, “sustainable development.” 273 But
usually, given lawmakers hesitance to transform these ideals
into concrete and binding law, there is little in the way of a
firm legal commitment in which to root such multifaceted
efforts, causing reality to fall short of expectations. 274 There is,
then, a strange and underappreciated alchemy to U.S. climate
change efforts proceeding predominantly through energy law:
as demonstrated in the previous section, electricity law
provides its own long-standing legal commitment to equity in
which to ground an effort to spread clean energy’s benefits
more broadly.
B. Affordability via Participation and the Regulatory Duty
of the Future
Climate

change

necessitates

that

electricity

from

Americans are significantly more likely to think that global warming should be a
U.S. governmental priority); LEISEROWITZ & AKERLOF, supra note 262, at 7. Note,
however, that most surveys focus on the correlation between attitudes towards
climate change and race, rather than income. Thus, although there is a longstanding correlation between minority status and lower incomes in the United
States, these surveys do not document a specific relationship between income
status and climate change attitudes. Cf. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE
D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
2013, at 5 (Sept. 2014), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SF2-7XBU] (showing real
median household income by race and Hispanic origin, 1967 to 2013).
272. See Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds.,
2014) (“Mitigation and adaptation can positively or negatively influence the
achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to human health, food
security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and
equitable sustainable development . . . .”).
273. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) (defining sustainable development
as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”).
274. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2115 (2005) (describing the results of the
sustainable development movement as “decidedly mixed, both in terms of
conceptual clarity and programmatic success”).
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particular sources and at particular times become more
expensive. To meet this challenge, regulators in leading states
have opted to create a more participatory grid that allows
consumers to manage the timing and source of their electricity
consumption. 275 Consumers who do not take advantage of these
opportunities will pay escalating rates that reflect the cost of
financing large-scale changes in generation and transmission
infrastructure. In this model, participation in the grid becomes
the means for maintaining affordable electricity, which is itself
ever more necessary to flourish in the American economy and
civil society.
What implications does this move have for regulators’
ongoing duties to ensure “just and reasonable rates” and
widespread access? At an empirical level, as Part I illustrated,
it may well be that certain clean energy policies are not as
harmful to low-income consumers as interested parties would
have regulators believe, particularly in the short run. Where
they do prove harmful, addressing problems of crosssubsidization will be important in addressing clean energy
justice concerns. Many novel attempts are underway to
properly value the contribution of clean energy technologies to
the grid 276 in ways that do not fundamentally undermine the
adoption of clean energy policy, and these are worth
encouraging.
However, reliance on this approach alone is shortsighted
and incomplete. In the long run, even after cross-subsidies are
eliminated, the clean energy policies that states are pursuing
may collectively create an America once again divided on
electricity grounds: the rich to their new set of wondrous
appliances, which save them money while doing good for the
planet, and the poor to their aging grid infrastructure, a
crumbling relic of past abundance that requires considerable
investment to decarbonize. This vision is hardly in accord with
electricity law’s twentieth-century commitments to widespread
electrification and affordability.
To avoid this outcome while inducing necessary shifts in
electricity consumption, electricity law requires an updated
version of the twentieth-century’s project of electrification. In
place of electrification, we require clean electrification: a

275.
276.

See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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widening of access to the participatory grid. 277
Lawmakers, regulators, and the public should care about
broadening grid participation for two reasons. The first is that
the history of electricity law demonstrates an abiding
commitment to providing widespread access to affordable
power. The only way for a consumer to maintain affordability
in states that create a participatory grid will be to become a
part of this project. Rates will rise for those who do not pay
attention to patterns of energy use, shift times of consumption,
or generate their own electricity. Although we might be
comfortable with this outcome in the case of consumers who
simply choose to pay more in order to maintain the convenience
of a twentieth-century lifestyle, our history indicates a deep
discomfort with allowing class dimensions to determine the
ability to access affordable power.
A class rift in electricity access presents particular cause
for concern in the current context of widening inequality, and
widening “energy poverty” in particular. 278 The number of
households eligible for income-based energy assistance
increased 70 percent between 1981 and 2008, from around 19
to 33 million. 279 These households continue to spend around
277. In May 2016, the New York Public Service Commission—which has been
a leader in considering issues of energy justice and clean energy—explicitly
embraced something akin to the principle of “clean electrification” I advocate here.
In adopting a new form of utility compensation under its “Reforming the Energy
Vision” proceeding, the Commission espoused the following principle regarding
access: “Customers with low and moderate incomes or who may be vulnerable to
losing service for other reasons should have access to energy efficiency and other
mechanisms that ensure they have electricity at an affordable cost.” Proceeding
on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, No. 14M-0101, at 112 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n May 19, 2016) (order). Cf. SOVACOOL &
DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 246 (calling for a similar principle of utilizing
renewable technologies to electrify low-income communities internationally).
278. Energy poverty’s definition is not without debate, but it is frequently
defined as spending more than ten percent of household income on energy. See,
e.g., Stephen Bird & Diana Hernández, Policy Options for the Split Incentive:
Increasing Energy Efficiency for Low-Income Renters, 48 ENERGY POL’Y 506, 507
(2012). See also SOVACOOL & DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 231 (defining “fuel
poverty” as spending “more than 10 or 15 percent of . . . monthly income on energy
bills”).
279. The predominant source of this assistance is the federal Low-Income
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). See APRISE INC., LIHEAP Home
Energy Notebook for Fiscal Year 2008, at 29 (2010) [hereinafter LIHEAP 2008].
Only around 15 percent of those qualifying for LIHEAP actually receive
assistance due to limited funding, and funding per household also decreased 10
percent between 1981 and 2008. See id.; see also Hernández & Bird, supra note
217, at 25; LIHEAP 2008, at xi. A more recent study found that “[o]ver the last
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fourteen percent of their income on home energy, as compared
to an average household expenditure of 7.4 percent.280
Consequently, in one survey half of low-income households
reported having to reduce spending for basic necessities in
order to meet their energy needs during periods of financial
instability, 281 and 80 percent reported “commonly . . . having
problems with utilities that include[] lack of affordability,
arrearages, and shut-offs.” 282 These consumers are the ones
who would most benefit from tools that give them the ability to
control energy bills, but are least likely to have the resources
necessary to take advantage of participatory grid policies. To do
nothing to promote their access to the participatory grid risks
undermining much of the historical purpose of electricity law.
Moreover, those who face energy poverty are often under
what is essentially a triple assault, with environmental justice,
climate change justice, and now, clean energy justice
challenges concentrated in the same group of individuals.283
Although the overlap is not perfect, many of the same
communities who bear a disproportionate burden of
environmental hazards, and who face the greatest risks (at
least domestically) with respect to climate change, are also the
ones who will have the hardest time participating in the
technology-heavy clean energy transition. The triple burden of
harm faced by these communities provides all the more reason
for regulators to focus on broadening participatory grid access
as a key strategy of clean energy justice.

decade alone, electricity expenditures as a proportion of low-income household
budgets increased by a third, while falling for higher earners.” PATRICK SABOL,
FROM POWER TO EMPOWERMENT: PLUGGING LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES INTO THE
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 1 (2015), http://groundswell.org/frompower_
to_empowerment_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W99-457Y].
280. LIHEAP 2008, supra note 279, at i. The “very poor” often spend more than
20 percent of income on energy. Hernández & Bird, supra note 217, at 7.
281. Lynne Chester, Energy Impoverishment: Addressing Capitalism’s New
Driver of Inequality, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 395, 395 (2014) (explaining how increased
energy bills lead to “social exclusion”).
282. Hernández & Bird, supra note 217, at 11 (reporting results of a 72household field survey conducted in an inner-city Boston neighborhood).
283. GORDON WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 193 (2012) (describing the
“double injustice” that arises from the fact that climate change will most harm
those already subject to the greatest environmental hazards).
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C. Beyond Economic Consequences
Affordability concerns alone justify a clean electrification
agenda, given the importance of electricity to participation in
the modern economy and society. But there is a second reason
that a commitment to clean electrification matters, which goes
beyond the economics of grid participation and speaks to the
purposes of grid interconnection in the first place. Lawmakers
have treated electricity as a special, foundational good because
it enhances citizens’ ability to lead productive, participatory
lives across multiple dimensions. Not only did electricity
provide relief from back-breaking and repetitive farm and
factory labor, but it also—via lamps for reading, radio, and
increased leisure time—made people feel part of a polis in ways
that had been previously unimaginable. 284 Indeed, it was the
process of connecting to the grid itself that engendered these
feelings for many rural Americans, through the sense of
empowerment they experienced in forming and managing
electric cooperatives. 285
The participatory grid provides an interesting opportunity
for reimagining these ideas of grid access as participation
enabling, given its inherently “participatory” nature. To be
sure, as discussed in Part I, grid participation offers perhaps a
bereft version of participation as compared to the community
spirit of electric cooperatives or direct democratic engagement
in debates about climate policy formation. But it appears to be
a growing method of engaging Americans in climate change
and part of a broad trend in U.S. society of using the market as
a locus of public engagement. 286
Though individualistic and market oriented, the
participatory grid provides an outlet for such civic engagement.
I have witnessed friends, all agog at their new solar panels,
unable to take their eyes off of their iPhone app tracking the
panels’ real-time output. Their delight at seeing moments of
over-production, when their panels were making more power
than their home was consuming, was more than the
satisfaction of saving a few cents. It was a feeling of control and
284. See supra notes 204–205 and accompanying text.
285. Cf. LILIENTHAL, supra note 199, at 76–77 (describing the importance of
the TVA’s “democratic methods,” which induced “widespread and intimate
participation” by the people of Appalachia in the project of rural electrification).
286. Kysar, supra note 74, at 533.
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contribution, of having done their part to fight a problem that
frequently induces feelings of helplessness and fatalism. 287
Psychologists sometimes refer to this feeling as “warm glow.”288
And indeed, the new Nest thermostat—which “automatically
adapts as your life and the seasons change” in order to keep
you comfortable while cutting electricity bills—seems to have
taken the warm glow notion literally, with a thermostat that
“lights up when you walk in the room,” as if to imply that after
installing it, you are doing good just by existing. 289
These examples highlight the psychological component of
participation in the participatory grid: not only does
participating save one money, it also creates a sense of
contributing to a project larger than oneself. 290 The
psychological benefits of grid participation are two-fold: first,
consumers benefit from the belief that their cuts in emissions
improve the world; second, and apart from actual impact, they
benefit from “the ability to express their moral and political
views” through choosing to participate—and how to
participate—in the grid. 291 These psychological benefits appear
to hold even in the context of fully cost-justified clean energy
investments. 292 In other words, even though states are
287. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
PSYCHOLOGY & GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF CHALLENGES
80 (observing that climate change can cause “fear, despair, or a sense of being
overwhelmed or powerless [that] can inhibit thought and action”).
288. See Roland Menges et al., Altruism, Warm Glow and the Willingness-toDonate for Green Electricity: An Artefactual Field Experiment, 31 ENVTL. & RES.
ECON. 431, 432 (2005) (finding that consumers purchasing green energy get a
“warm glow” from knowing they are contributing to environmental quality);
Patrick Hartmann & Vanessa Apaolaza-Ibáñez, Consumer Attitude and Purchase
Intention Toward Green Energy Brands: The Roles of Psychological Benefits and
Environmental Concern, 65 J. BUS. RES. 1254, 1254 (2012) (identifying “warm
glow feelings derived from the moral satisfaction of contributing to the common
good” as one of green energy’s psychological benefits).
289. Meet the Nest Thermostat, https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nestthermostat/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RVQ4-PDPP].
290. See supra note 288.
291. Kysar, supra note 74, at 581, 604 (explaining how consumers derive
satisfaction across multiple dimensions by participating in market-shaping
purchasing decisions through both believing that their choices have real-world
impact and finding self-expressive value in the act of choosing).
292. See Varun Rai & Kristine McAndrews, Decision-making and Behavior
Change in Residential Adopters of Solar PV, https://ases.conferenceservices.net/resources/252/2859/pdf/SOLAR2012_0785_full%20paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q63P-8DRD] (surveying homeowners’ decisions to install netmetered solar panels and finding that environmental concern was equal in
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constructing a model where financial benefits alone might
justify grid participation, it appears that many of those
participating derive psychological satisfaction in addition to
financial gain.
If low(er)-income consumers are disempowered in this
transformation, they lose the ability to play a role in solving
one of the greatest collective action problems our country and
world have ever faced. Whereas electrification empowered a
broader swath of Americans across multiple dimensions, the
participatory grid risks disempowerment not only through
escalating costs but also through segmentation of Americans’
ability to become a part of the political project of mitigating
climate change, channeled as it is through consumer-oriented
grid policies. A project to extend access to the participatory grid
is thus important on a level that transcends economics and
allows electricity law’s commitment to engendering civic
participation to endure, even as that participation takes new
shapes in today’s market-oriented society. 293
This argument over the centrality of participation as a
component of clean energy justice reflects lessons learned
during the rise of the environmental justice movement. What
began in environmental justice as a concern over unequal
distribution of environmental hazards and benefits quickly
grew to have a participatory dimension, as communities
recognized that voice and access in decisions affecting their
environment and health were a critical component of the
justice they sought. 294 Similarly, creating a just participatory
grid will require more than regulatory tweaks to limit crosssubsidization; it requires taking the steps necessary to create
full, equal opportunity for engagement in the new grid
paradigm.

importance to financial benefits).
293. Cf. SOVACOOL & DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 245 (arguing that “energy
systems ought to maximize welfare . . . in the ability to enable persons to realize
functionings and capabilities,” and that “every person has a right to a ‘social
minimum’ of energy or electricity so that they can enjoy a modern, healthy
lifestyle”).
294. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 1, at 13, 16; WALKER, supra note 283, at
218–19 (arguing for distributive, procedural, and recognition dimensions to
environmental justice).
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D. Recognizing the Challenges
Although there are important parallels with electrification,
clean electrification is a more contentious and complex
program than its historical counterpart. We could all connect to
the grid. We cannot all put solar panels on our roofs; we will
not become a nation of “yeoman windfarmers.” 295 There are
practical limits to where such technologies are appropriate 296
and technological limits to how much distributed generation
can be integrated into the grid without causing blackouts. 297
Similarly, any possibility of widespread, grid exit via a
combination of on-site generation and storage is not likely soon
and presents its own complicated trade-offs. 298 But not all
participatory grid technologies are so constrained. Many
technologies focus on shifting the time and shape of demand in
ways that not only are free of scale limitations, but also work to
allow more distributed generation to participate in the grid. In
particular, “good old energy efficiency” and demand response
are likely to prove options available to all households, without
any corresponding downside in terms of technological limits to
participation. 299
295. Douglas A. Kysar, The Consultant’s Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041,
2056 (2008) (reviewing TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK
THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF
POSSIBILITY (2007)) (critiquing a vision of a “new social future” comprised of
“yeoman windfarmers forming Toquevillian associations on MySpace” as a way to
advance environmental aims).
296. See Booth, supra note 92, at 768 (explaining that 75 percent of ratepayers
do not own homes with roofs “structurally suitable” for solar).
297. See MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 53–76 (2011) (explaining the intermittency
challenges of solar and wind, which are not available on demand but rather at the
whims of nature, which creates a need for alternative sources that can quickly
respond to changes in wind or solar supply). See also Cardwell, supra note 131
(reporting on rooftop-solar-induced “voltage fluctuations that can overload
circuits, burn lines and lead to brownouts or blackouts”). There is, predictably,
debate over precisely how much distributed generation the grid is capable of
handling. See, e.g., Jeff St. John, How Much Renewable Energy Can the Grid
Handle?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/on-the-uncertain-edge-of-the-renewable-powered-grid [https://perm
a.cc/5WCC-ZXH9].
298. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID 16–20 (2014)
(making the case that grid connection is more valuable than is often appreciated,
both for individual consumers and for the sake of the system).
299. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 297, at 57 (describing how demand
response can provide operating reserves to counterbalance renewables’
intermittency).
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Clean electrification, with its focus on specifically
empowering grid participation, might be challenged by that
camp of economists who would advise against any effort to
effectuate redistribution other than through the income tax
scheme. 300 Their argument, in brief, is that climate change
mitigation policies provide an inefficient avenue for alleviating
present-day distributional inequities, such that society would
be better served by implementing all efficient clean energy
policies and compensating for any resulting inequities through
tax redistribution. 301
One problem with this argument is that solving the
participatory grid’s equity challenges via tax redistribution is
unlikely to be a realistic political strategy. 302 Perhaps a more
feasible strategy would be to simply increase traditional
welfare-type benefits for energy, under LIHEAP and its state
equivalents. Increased support for meeting mounting energy
bills would certainly help those unable to participate in the
grid cope with energy poverty, but may be ill-advised for
several reasons. First, increasing levels of financial support for
families struggling to pay their electricity bills fails to reflect
the societal importance of reducing electricity demand—to the
contrary, it may perversely incentivize more consumption.303
Second, even if families wanted to spend any additional
support they received on-demand reduction technologies, they
would still face well-documented investment barriers that can
be
eliminated
only
by
more
targeted
regulatory
interventions. 304
300. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000).
301. See generally id.; see also POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 258 at 4, 175.
302. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Introduction to FAIRNESS
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (Univ. of Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 489, 2014) (arguing that the high political costs of tax redistribution
may make it cheaper to redistribute outside the tax scheme); Daniel A. Farber,
Climate Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 985, 989 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER &
DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2011)) (“To say that we should not
engage in redistribution unless we can implement the ideal form of redistribution
is really to say that we should not engage in redistribution at all.”).
303. See Rhett Larson, Adapting Human Rights, 26 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
1 (2015) (arguing that increased subsidies for electricity “preclude cost
internalization and conservation incentives,” and might “aggravate the
sustainability challenges associated with global climate change”).
304. See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., OVERCOMING
MARKET BARRIERS & USING MARKET FORCES TO ADVANCE ENERGY EFFICIENCY
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More fundamentally, neither a strategy of tax reform nor
increasing traditional energy welfare payments accords with
the normative commitment that the country has developed to
electricity as foundational to meaningful lives and
livelihoods. 305 In the twentieth century, legislators and
regulators focused on expanding access to electricity because
they valued its spread in particular, not merely more equal
distribution of goods in general. In a similar vein, there might
be sound reasons for commissions and legislatures to prefer
targeted support in the case of clean energy, rather than
income tax redistribution or increased bill support, because
they place value upon enhancing the ability of all citizens to
join the participatory grid. 306 In choosing to subsidize
participation in the grid rather than consumption, regulators
help shape norms that place particular value on becoming a
part of the project to reduce energy consumption. 307 Because of
this interrelationship between regulatory design and norms,
redistribution via the tax code or increased bill support would
lack much of the normative force of widening grid
participation.
IV. IMPLEMENTING CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION
Once lawmakers are convinced of the imperative to pursue
an agenda of clean electrification, questions abound regarding
implementation. In this Part, I want to make three broad
points on this topic without purporting to craft a
comprehensive agenda, which will have to occur on a state-bystate basis, ideally with significant community participation. 308
First, public utility law provides some room for promoting clean
electrification but cannot unilaterally achieve the vision, just
as it could not unilaterally electrify America. Second, although
2–3 (2014) (collecting commonly identified failures that prevent full achievement
of cost-effective energy efficiency).
305. See supra Part I.
306. Cf. Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1393, 1396–97 (1981) (explaining how many of our laws appropriately reflect
preferences for ends other than efficiency).
307. Cf. Jerry Mashaw, Accountability & Institutional Design: Some Thoughts
on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS
& EXPERIENCES 135 (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006) (describing how provision of goods
and services is itself “a regime of social control that entails norm creation”).
308. Cf. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining the importance of
participation in the environmental justice movement).
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we must therefore rely on legislation, we need not despair at
this prospect: existing mechanisms for promoting clean energy
might be tailored specifically towards promoting clean
electrification in ways that do not necessitate significant new
expenditures. And third, in moving forward with
conceptualizing and crafting a participatory grid, lawmakers
and regulators might place more emphasis on community-scale
grid participation, not only for its practical ability to broaden
participation, but for its more collective valence.
A. Clean Electrification within Public Utility Law
Public utility law’s “just and reasonable” rates and “no
undue discrimination” standards have endured the test of time
largely because they have proven malleable. 309 As public
sentiment and policy priorities have shifted, so have legal
understandings. Dynamic pricing rests on a new
understanding that time-based discrimination is just, given the
need to avoid building ever more infrastructure. 310 And
commissions concerned with environmental outcomes have
increasingly interpreted “just and reasonable” rate standards
to permit the pursuit of aims other than the cheapest power
available. 311 There is likely room within these concepts for
promoting widespread inclusion within new participatory grid
policies, particularly those funded by other ratepayers. For
example, commissions might interpret these mandates to
require that ratepayer-funded initiatives be distributed
relatively evenly among the ratepayers funding them, as
California has recently done in requiring ten percent of its
solar incentives to go to low-income households. 312 Just and
reasonable rate standards could also justify placing protections
on dynamic pricing programs to ensure that they do not
309. Trebing, supra note 21, at 31 (noting regulators’ “strong desire to
maintain flexibility or a large area of discretion in applying equity judgments”).
310. See Paul Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in The HANDBOOK OF
LAW & ECON. 92 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (unpublished
manuscript) http://economics.mit.edu/files/1180 [https://perma.cc/2NRN-ZCZQ]
(explaining that dynamic pricing avoids being labeled price discrimination
because “peak and off-peak consumption are essentially separate products”).
311. See Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth & Jason Rich, The
Environmental Duties of Public Utilities Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
325, 327 (2001).
312. See Distributed Generation & Distributed Energy Res., D. 06-01-024, 2006
WL 162584 (Cal. Pub. Util. Jan. 12, 2006) 5, 39–40 (interim order).
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disproportionately harm low-income consumers over time. 313
Two prominent policy debates occurring at commissions
around the country are also amenable to incorporating clean
electrification concerns. The first is the regulatory debate over
how to harness new data that the modernized grid provides.
Smart meters provide “interval data” that measure energy
consumption granularly, in as little as fifteen-minute
intervals. 314 These data can show where participatory grid
technologies
might
prove
most
beneficial—both
environmentally and economically—in a much more targeted
way than has previously been possible, and could thus be
useful in efforts to design programs to empower more
consumers as grid participants. 315 However, due to privacy
concerns, questions of who owns and has access to these data
have proven controversial in many states. 316
A commitment to clean electrification might help shape
commissions’ legal choices about how to manage this data.
Reforming data policies would be a cost-effective step for many
commissions to take in exploring a clean electrification agenda.
Concrete data pointing to the potential for low-income
households to save energy could spur new programs and
suggest new directions in which to tailor existing programs.317
Better data analysis could also allow for the design of dynamic
pricing schemes that appropriately protect and empower
consumers. 318 For all of these reasons, in proceeding with
debates over consumer privacy versus the benefits of open
access, scholars, advocates, and regulators should keep in mind
the ways in which more information could help diffuse
technologies more broadly, beyond those consumers selfmotivated to seek them out.
Clean electrification considerations will also be important
in the question facing commissions about utilities’ role in the
participatory grid. One of the ways in which utilities might
Cf. Faruqui, supra note 108 (suggesting such limits).
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, AN ASSESSMENT OF
INTERVAL DATA AND THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL
ELECTRICITY END-USE MONITORING, U.S. 1 (Feb. 2015).
315. See STEPHENS, WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 26, at 88–91.
316. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 59, at 88.
317. Cf. id. at 71 (noting that “one of the critical barriers” to accomplishing
known potential energy efficiency savings “is adequate data on energy
consumption”).
318. See FARUQUI, HLEDIK & PALMER, supra note 62.
313.
314.
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reinvigorate their business model to compete in changing
energy markets is to themselves become owners or sellers of
participatory grid technologies. 319 The idea, however, is
controversial: it risks giving utilities precisely the market
power that a decentralized marketplace hopes to suppress via
innovation. 320 Opponents worry that regulated utilities might
use their regulated monopoly status to undercut competitive,
independent service providers, thereby dampening the market
for such services in the long term. 321
Clean energy justice concerns, though, may point towards
the benefits of at least a limited role for utilities in this context.
Utilities have historical relationships with a wide range of
consumers and may be able to reach low-income consumers
more easily—and with a greater level of trust—than thirdparty service providers can. 322 For this reason, New York
recently decided to make an exception to its general rule
restricting utility ownership of participatory grid technologies
and will allow utilities to own technology used in programs
targeting low or moderate income customers. 323 This strategy
might prove a powerful force for incentivizing utilities to focus
on this otherwise potentially neglected group. As other states
grapple with the same utility ownership debate, they should
consider the benefits of permitting utilities to have a special
role in broadening participation in evolving markets.
B. The Limits of Public Utility Law
If these reform proposals seem modest, it is for good
reason: there are obvious limits to public utility law’s abilities
319. See Troy A. Rule, Unnatural Monopolies: Why Utilities Don’t Belong in
Rooftop Solar Markets, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 387, 402 (2016) (describing a number of
utility efforts to use this “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” strategy).
320. See N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 43–44 (describing utility
ownership of distributed energy resources (DER) as “one of the most contentious
issues in the REV proceeding,” and concluding that “unrestricted utility
participation in DER markets presents a risk of undermining markets more than
a potential for accelerating market growth”).
321. See id.; see also Rule, supra note 319, at 4–5 (arguing that allowing
utilities to compete in rooftop solar markets “stacks the deck” in favor of the
utilities).
322. See Graffy & Kihm, supra note 14, at 38 (“Utilities have several wellestablished characteristics that become chief assets in an environment of flux:
namely a reputation of service reliability, customer trust, and name recognition.”).
323. N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 45–46.
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to resolve disparities within the participatory grid. Public
utility law is likely to prove an innovation and a constraint for
clean electrification, just as it was for twentieth-century
electrification.
Commissions control many decisions shaping the
electricity grid and electricity supply, but they face an
important internal constraint: ratepayer funding. 324 In some
cases, expanding programs like energy efficiency and demand
response to a broader group of consumers can lower the rates
paid by all, such that commissions can justify the expenditure
of ratepayer funding. 325 However, energy law’s equity
commitment suggests that it may be worthwhile to invest
public resources in clean electrification projects beyond those
that immediately negate other grid expenditures. 326 In these
cases, particularly in a system increasingly concerned about
chasing away the most affluent ratepayers while retaining
those of lesser means, a ratepayer-funded support system will
make less and less sense. 327
For these reasons, it probably will require legislative
efforts to fully accomplish an agenda of clean electrification,
funded not exclusively by ratepayers, but by taxpayers as a
whole. Such efforts will be challenging; after all, one of the
primary appeals of “taxation by regulation” was its ability to
make the costs of achieving redistribution less apparent. 328
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions are beginning to make
progress on this front. For example, Washington, D.C.’s city
council passed a new renewable portfolio standard in 2016 that
not only requires the city to source 50 percent of its electricity
from renewables by 2032, but also establishes a “Solar for All”
fund to assist with a new mandate to “reduce by at least 50%
324. See Posner, supra note 21; Gray, supra note 172.
325. See, e.g., Petition of Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. for Approval of
Brooklyn Queens Demand Mgmt. Program., 14-E-0302, 2014 WL 7049164, at *1–
5 (N.Y.P.S.C. Dec. 12, 2014) (approving the acquisition of 41 megawatts of ratepayer funded, consumer-side solutions in low-income communities as a way to
delay building expensive sub-transmission infrastructure).
326. Cf. Scott, supra note 135, at 390 (arguing that commissions have
historically only approved efficiency and diversity of supply initiatives when they
would “maximize cost savings” or at least “would not add to customer rates”).
327. Cf. Posner, supra note 21, at 46 (observing that it is a “little peculiar” to
subsidize the customers of a certain regulated industry via other customers of the
same industry, rather than via taxpayers at large).
328. Id.; see supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text for discussion of the
concept of “taxation by regulation.”
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the electric bills of at least 100,000 of the District’s low-income
households with high energy burdens” by 2032. 329 Further
possibilities for targeting low-income communities may emerge
if states move forward with Clean Power Plan
implementation 330: the Plan’s optional “Clean Energy Incentive
Program” is designed to help states “meet their goals under the
plan by removing barriers to investment in energy efficiency
and solar measures in low-income communities.” 331
Legislative efforts to train clean energy efforts in more
equitable directions need not entail the creation of entirely new
programs. Many states are already innovating in clean energy
finance, and these models could be extended and targeted for a
clean electrification agenda. 332 State “green banks” in
particular have gained traction recently. Green banks leverage
existing public funding in order to attract greater private sector
funds for clean energy and energy efficiency projects. 333 They
do so by using financing tools that are self-sustaining, like onbill financing, credit enhancements, bonds, and coinvestments. 334 Connecticut, New York, Hawaii, and Vermont
329. Council B. No. B21-0650, the Renewable Portfolio Standard Expansion
Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. 2016) (signed July 25, 2016). In adopting a similar
50 percent RPS requirement, to be met by 2030, and doubling energy efficiency
requirements for existing buildings, California also mandated that its Public
Utilities Commission “develop and publish a study on barriers for low-income
customers to energy efficiency and weatherization investments, including those in
disadvantaged communities, as well as recommendations on how to increase
access to energy efficiency and weatherization investments to low-income
customers.” That study is due before January 1, 2017. See S.B. 350, 2015–16 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adopted Sept. 2015).
330. See supra note 38 for details on the current legal status of the Clean
Power Plan.
331. See EPA, Clean Energy Incentive Program, https://www.epa.gov/
cleanpowerplan/clean-energy-incentive-program (last visited August 26, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/K7TQ-J25X].
332. See, e.g., Sandeep Nandivada, Energy-Efficiency Retrofits in the
Commercial Sector: An Analysis of PACE Financing, On-Bill Repayment, and
Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 363, 366–67
(2014); Neil Peretz, Growing the Energy Efficiency Market Through Third-Party
Financing, 30 ENERGY L.J. 377, 391–92 (2009); Jason R. Wiener & Christian
Alexander, On-Site Renewable Energy and Public Finance: How and Why
Municipal Bond Financing Is the Key to Propagating Access to on-Site Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
559, 559–60 (2010); Art Harrington & Amy Heart, PACE Financing Opportunities
for Environmental and Energy Lawyers, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 8, 8 (2014); see
BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46; see also Hallie Kennan, State Green Banks for Clean
Energy, (Energy Innovation, Working Paper Jan. 2014).
333. See Kennan, supra note 332, at 1–2; BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 1.
334. Kennan, supra note 332, at 1.
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are leading a growing number of states in adopting green bank
programs. 335
In addition, many states retain significant, more
traditional financing structures, which provide incentives and
rebates to consumers for the installation of a number of
technologies, including energy efficiency and distributed
generation. 336 And state-level cap-and-trade programs provide
a substantial source of revenue for those states that choose to
sell off, rather than give away, greenhouse gas emissions
permits. 337
These tools that spur clean energy could also drive clean
electrification. But in order for them to do so, program
designers must make enabling widespread participation a
priority. Programs could expand several different ways. One
option is set-asides, such as California’s reservation of ten
percent of its “California Solar Initiative” funding for lowincome residences, 338 and the state’s requirement that twentyfive percent of revenues from its cap-and-trade auctions go to
projects that benefit identified disadvantaged communities. 339
Or, programs could enable wider participation by targeting
either particular types of consumers or particular technologies:
for example, green banks might extend clean energy loan
guarantees on behalf of those whose credit scores would
otherwise not qualify them for funding; or incentive and rebate
programs might specifically target technologies that
administrators determine are best suited for helping lowincome households reduce energy usage. 340 Such efforts might
335. Id. at 4.
336. See BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6 (explaining that historically, state
programs have “tended to focus mostly on individual project financing and
deployment through the use of one-off rebates, grants and performance-based
incentives that have directly subsidized the installation of clean energy
technologies”).
337. See, e.g., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC., INVESTMENT OF
RGGI PROCEEDS THROUGH 2013, at 5 (2015) (reporting that participating states
spent $1.02 billion, out of $1.57 billion earned from the cap-and-trade program, in
energy efficiency and renewable energy investments).
338. See supra note 312.
339. See S.B. 535, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adopted Sept. 30. 2012).
340. One example of an effort in this vein is the Obama Administration’s
recent announcement of a new “Clean Energy Savings For All Initiative,” which
operates primarily by tweaking existing financing programs to ensure that federal
mortgage requirements do not stand in the way of property owners installing
solar programs financed through bill savings. See Press Release, The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Obama Administration
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also include targeted outreach to low-income communities,
which has been shown effective in increasing levels of
participation. 341
Ultimately, my goal here is not to pick among these policy
options, but rather to make a broader point with respect to
these and other potential programs: a deeper understanding of
energy law’s focus on access should embolden legislators and
regulators to restructure clean energy policies in directions
that enable broader grid participation. It is time to move away
from equity as an argument against clean energy, towards a
broader understanding of energy equity that demands a
widening of access to the participatory grid.
C. Beyond Individualism
This Article has largely taken the unfolding participatory
grid vision as a given. It has accepted regulators’ dominant
concept of the participatory grid as revolving around
empowered consumers who are incentivized to act within the
confines of their own property to construct a new relationship
with the grid—a relationship likely to be automated to the
point that it in fact involves limited “participation” in the
traditional sense. But the vision remains largely inchoate,
making it worth asking whether this is the “participatory” grid
we want.
There is emerging evidence that many people prefer to
engage in climate mitigation as community members rather
than as consumers. 342 We like knowing that others are
contributing,
and
we
gain
empowerment
through
collectivity. 343 These recent findings resonate with the U.S.
Announces Clean Energy Savings for All Americans Initiative (July 19, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/19/fact-sheet-obamaadministration-announces-clean-energy-savings-all
[https://perma.cc/QDE6XPZ9]. Whether program administrators and regulators—rather than executives
or legislators—could make decisions to target low-income consumers or
technologies would depend on the authorizing language of the program in
question.
341. Hernández & Bird, supra note 217, at 19.
342. Eva Heiskanen et al., Low-Carbon Communities as a Context for
Individual Behavioural Change, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 7586, 7586 (2010).
343. Id.; cf. Robyn Bolton, The Persuasive Pressure of Peer Rankings, HARV.
BUS. REV. (May 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/the-persuasive-pressure-of-peerrankings [https://perma.cc/N8PG-UZ8E]
(describing how energy efficiency
companies use peer data to induce greater savings among neighbors).
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experience of rural electrification almost a century ago:
working together to finance and build power lines imbued
communities with a sense of democratic spirit beyond what
might have been accomplished had the lines been subsidized
through general tax revenue. 344
In several states, legislators and regulators have adopted
versions of participatory grid policies that help to foster more
collective notions of participation. One concept that has caught
hold recently is that of “community net metering,” which allows
for multiple consumers to purchase shares in a single netmetered system—often called a “solar garden”—that can be
located off-site but whose generation is credited to the
participating consumers’ energy bills. 345 At least eleven states
and Washington, D.C. have authorized community net
metering or related pilot projects. 346 These efforts may
significantly improve the ability of low-income consumers to
participate in self-generation, as they eliminate the
prerequisite of owning a solar-appropriate home. 347 Solar
gardens also ease the burdens of participation, as they do not
require each participant to individually seek out, install, and
maintain solar panels. 348 As champions of such projects have
noted, such projects can also make good use of blighted lands,
take advantage of economies of scale available to larger-scale
systems, raise awareness of solar power through placement in
public areas, and provide participants the same “tangible sense
of investment in energy production” that home solar panels
344. Cf. Part II.B.
345. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-127 (West 2015) (defining a
“community solar garden” as a solar facility belonging to at least ten subscribers
located “in or near a community”); See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 140
(West 2016); see also Herman K. Trabish, How Virtual Net Metering Will Save
Low Income Massachusetts Residents $60 Million, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-virtual-net-metering-will-save-low-incomemassachusetts-residents-60-m/342105/[https://perma.cc/C3SV-MQUR] (explaining
how virtual net metering can help low-income consumers who cannot install
distributed generation on-site reap the bill savings of net metering).
346. See Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/netmetering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx (last visited Sept. 3,
2015) [https://perma.cc/V5G3-MFWF]. Those states are California, Colorado,
Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Washington. Id.
347. See Samantha Booth, Community Solar: Reviving California’s
Commitment to A Bright Energy Future, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10585, 10585 (2013).
348. Id. at 10588.
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do. 349 And the community scale of the projects creates “mutual
support and understanding” among adopters that can make
investing in such projects less intimidating and more
rewarding. 350
Another community-scale effort gaining traction is that of
“micro-grids,” technically defined as “a group of interconnected
loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined
electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity
with respect to the grid.” 351 In practical terms, such systems
usually involve a combination of distributed generation,
storage, and demand response resources located within a
discrete geographic area that are rendered capable of
functioning separately from the remaining grid. 352 Many hope
such systems might be capable of simultaneously “advancing
energy sustainability, system resiliency, and consumer
affordability goals,” and might also reinforce the sense of
community-scale cooperation and self-sufficiency. 353
These examples illustrate how regulators might begin to
think more expansively about what “participation” in the grid
means, and ways that they can engender participation beyond
individual,
house-by-house
efforts.
Commissions
and
lawmakers have significant roles to play in creating conditions
where arrangements like community net metering and microgrid can flourish. Simply altering legal background rules to
allow each of these systems to exist would be an important first
step for most states. 354 In the spirit of rural electrification,
policy-makers might also think about how to extend loans and
technical support to groups interested in experimenting with
more collective forms of decarbonizing the grid.
Finally, it is worth remembering that despite all of the
recent celebration of the participatory grid as the next frontier
in electricity law, many—probably most—of the decisions that
349. Hannah J. Wiseman & Sara C. Bronin, Community-Scale Renewable
Energy, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 165, 165–66 (2013); Booth, supra
note 347, at 10591.
350. Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 349, at 166.
351. Kevin B. Jones et al., The Urban Microgrid: Smart Legal and Regulatory
Policies to Support Electric Grid Resiliency and Climate Mitigation, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1695, 1697–98 (2014).
352. Id. at 1703–04.
353. Id. at 1679; see also Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with
Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010).
354. See Jones et al., supra note 351, at 1712–13; Bronin, supra note 353, at
547 (noting that “state laws prohibit or severely limit [microgrids’] viability”).

9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION

4/10/2017 7:27 PM

649

we make about how to respond to climate change will not be at
the individual scale. Instead, we are facing critical strategic
questions about the future of our collective grid: whether to
invest heavily in next-generation nuclear facilities, or carbon
capture and storage, or an offshore transmission corridor for
wind, or some combination of the above. 355 Most of us are likely
to remain tied to the grid and have a stake in its future shape.
Irrespective of individual ability to invest in climate change
solutions, all citizens might have a voice in decisions about the
future composition of large-scale U.S. electricity generation. 356
Although beyond the scope of this Article, better enabling this
type of traditional citizen participation should also be one of
our priorities for clean energy policy.
V. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION
Stripped to its barest aspirations, the clean energy
transition is one of switching fuel sources, from those that emit
greenhouse gases to those that don’t. 357 Such a switch might
alleviate or exacerbate inequality depending on the form it
takes. 358 The participatory grid retains the ability to do either,
depending on how it is implemented. For this reason, clean
energy justice concerns raised against dominant clean energy
policies deserve serious consideration.
This Article has argued that energy regulators and energy
law scholars can productively reorient current debates around
clean energy’s distributive consequences by returning to
electricity law’s core equity norms. Electricity law’s
fundamental commitment—imperfectly realized though it has
been—is to widespread, affordable power, in the service of
empowering people to lead productive and meaningful lives.
For lawmakers to proceed with their twenty-first century
355. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 24.
356. Cf. Amartya Sen, Global Warming is Just One of Many Environmental
Threats that Demand Our Attention, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 22, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/118969/environmentalists-obsess-about-globalwarming-ignore-poor-countries
[https://perma.cc/7JKM-RBW2]
(urging
environmentalists and the public to think beyond only the carbon externalities of
various energy sources).
357. See Clark A. Miller, Alastair Iles & Christopher F. Jones, The Social
Dimensions of Energy Transitions, 22 SCI. AS CULTURE 135, 140 (2013).
358. Cf. Sujatha Raman, Fossilizing Renewable Energies, 22 SCI. AS CULTURE
172, 178 (2013) (questioning whether renewable energy is “intrinsically
democratic and egalitarian” in ways that some progressives seem to believe).
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project of creating a participatory grid, electricity law demands
a reorientation of this longstanding norm, focused on
broadening the range of people able to participate in the grid
and reap the attendant financial and psychological gains.
Is an agenda of clean electrification realistic? Proposals for
redistributional policies are met with understandable
skepticism in today’s political climate. 359 Perhaps counterintuitively, Americans’ appetite for redistribution has
diminished as inequality has increased over the last several
decades. 360 Nevertheless, in this conclusion, I want to briefly
suggest some reasons for optimism regarding clean
electrification’s politics.
There are two reasons that clean electrification should
prove politically feasible. The first is that clean energy—a
generally popular aim—cannot move forward without
attending to its equity implications. Recent survey results
suggest that around 87 percent of Americans think developing
clean energy should be a very high (26 percent), high (32
percent), or medium government priority (28 percent). 361 At the
same time, in part due to the notorious partisanship of
Congress, federal funding for clean energy has fallen over the
last several years. 362 In its place, states wishing to decarbonize
will be forced to craft their own strategies to reduce carbon

359. See Suzanna Sherry, Property is the New Privacy: The Coming
Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1475 (2015) (warning of the
perils of marginalization “[i]f liberal legal academics continue to assume the
legitimacy of the New Deal and dismiss contrary conservative theory as out of the
mainstream”).
360. See, e.g., Matthew Luttig, The Structure of Inequality and Americans’
Attitudes Towards Redistribution, 77 PUB. OPINION Q. 811 (2013). Note, however,
that this trend may now be shifting. See Noam Scheiber & Dalia Sussman,
Inequality Troubles Americans Across Party Lines, Times/CBS Poll Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/business/inequality-amajor-issue-for-americans-times-cbs-poll-finds.html
[https://perma.cc/4NLBLK3D] (finding that “the percentage of Americans who say everyone has a fair
chance to get ahead in today’s economy has fallen 17 percentage points since early
2014” and support for redistributive policies has risen).
361. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
CLIMATE
AND
CLEAN
ENERGY
POLICIES
IN
APRIL
2013,
http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/article/Climate-PolicySupport-April-2013#sthash.kCMlJTkh.dpuf [https://perma.cc/ZC5X-JBQH].
362. BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 2; see also MEGAN NICHOLSON &
MATTHEW STEPP, BREAKING DOWN FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN CLEAN ENERGY
(2013),
http://www2.itif.org/2013-breaking-down-investment-energy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZFJ8-HY75].
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emissions, 363 putting more pressure on them to aggressively
pursue and fund clean energy policies. As this Article has
shown, “equity” can act either as a roadblock for such policies,
or as a way to widen their reach. Given the depth of regulators’
commitment to equity issues, it is quite likely that the only
way clean energy advocates can achieve the progress they
desire is to work harder on integrating equity concerns into
clean energy policies.
Second, clean electrification might build broad—and odd—
coalitions. Clean electrification is far from a radical solution to
the equity challenges raised by the participatory grid. 364 It is
rooted in the notion that increased participation in new
marketplaces, incentivized by price signals, will allow a wide
swath of Americans to buy down their contributions to climate
change and thereby maintain affordable power. Accomplishing
this vision will require the proliferation of new technologies,
and in this way it closely resembles the original project of
electrification. 365 It is thus unsurprising that some of the same
companies that supported electrification, including General
Electric and Westinghouse, show similar enthusiasm for the
participatory turn in electricity management. 366 These
companies would likely support efforts to extend their new
technologies to a wider number of American households, as
would many of the emerging “energy service companies”
dedicated to helping households take advantage of
participatory grid incentives. 367
Two other political contingencies might make more
surprising supporters. As the previous section suggested, even
utilities, typically cast as the natural opponents of a more
363. See supra note 38.
364. Cf. Kysar, supra note 274, at 2115 (“[C]ampaigns to encourage publiclyoriented market behavior . . . have the great virtue of avoiding head-on
confrontation between the competing theoretical conceptions of sustainable
development and market liberalism.”).
365. See supra Part I.C.
366. See STEPHENS, WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 26, at 69–70 (noting that
both incumbents like General Electric and Westinghouse, as well as fledgling
energy management companies, see the smart grid as a “major business
opportunity”); see also NAVIGANT RESEARCH, SMART APPLIANCES: INTELLIGENT
CONTROL, POWER MANAGEMENT, AND NETWORKING TECHNOLOGIES FOR
HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES ON THE SMART GRID: GLOBAL MARKET ANALYSIS AND
FORECASTS 2 (2012) (predicting “worldwide smart appliance sales to reach nearly
$35 billion by 2020”).
367. STEPHENS, WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 26, at 69–70.
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participatory grid, might be given reasons to support clean
electrification if it can help their faltering business model.368
And finally, there is a libertarian strain to consumer
empowerment that makes these policies popular in unexpected
locales and quarters: in Oklahoma, for example, a movement
backed by Tea Party conservatives recently convinced the
state’s Republican governor to resist efforts to impose fees on
solar panel owners. 369 Although libertarians are not likely to
embrace clean electrification’s redistributive dimension with
open arms, they might at least come to accept it as a necessary
component of an agenda of electric self-sufficiency and
competition. These possible coalitions provide reason for
optimism about the ability of scholars and lawmakers to create
and implement clean electrification programs, once properly
convinced of their place within electricity law.
Clean electrification provides a way to avoid collision
between the equities of energy law and the inequities of climate
change, and represents one important path forward on clean
energy justice. The urgency of climate change—and the fact
that none of us can help but contribute to it—suggests that
never before have we needed to widen participation in a social
project as much as will be necessary in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. It is fortunate, then, that U.S. electricity law
provides its own way forward, from a twentieth-century focus
on widespread access to the grid, to a twenty-first-century focus
on broadened participation in the grid.

368. See supra Part IV.A.
369. Josh Voorhees, The Tea Party Wants to Help You Go Solar, SLATE (Apr.
23, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/04/
oklahoma_sb_1456_why_the_tea_party_is_fighting_for_solar_power.html
[https://perma.cc/T5X3-PRZR]; Okla. Exec. Order No. 2014-07 (April 21, 2014); see
also
TUSK,
Tell
Utilities
Solar
Won’t
Be
Killed,
http://dontkillsolar.com/tusk/what-we-want/ (last visited June 3, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/C7P7-WP6B] (Republican-led campaign against “monopoly
utilities . . . extinguish[ing] the independent rooftop solar market in America”);
John Murawski, Republicans Push to Expand Solar Power in NC, RALEIGH NEWS
&
OBS.
(Apr.
7,
2015),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/
article17789870.html [https://perma.cc/W6YG-FKHE]; Ivan Penn, Tea Party
Pushing for Florida to Step up Solar Energy Efforts, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 17,
2014),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/tea-party-pushing-forflorida-to-step-up-solar-energy-efforts/2202617 [https://perma.cc/EW76-JDUD].

